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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
We belong to a time of crisis. Everywhere it is invoked and everywhere it is
confIrmed. FrorIl the threat of global climate change, of impending acts of terror, of the
shock waves still to come of world market collapse, it is clear that the world to which we
belong rests precariously on the edge of a very real and fragile precipice.1 Equally evident is
the fact that the fate of our time depends on the decisions and interventions for which we,
as a generation, will have been responsible. In other words, our time is marked by the
urgency of decision. And yet, in a critical time, this sense of urgency is often sapped by the
perception of powerlessness.
Reflections ernerging from a time of crisis are often concerned with questions as to
the empirical factors which have elicited specifIc crises. Consider, for instance, how the
discussion surrounding the global financial crisis of the late 2000's has, by and large, been
dominated by questions concerning its causes. Yet, in an age claimed by successive and
apparently unrelated crises, these reflections seem to be, of themselves, insufficient. In a
time suffused with an acute awareness of crisis, then, it befIts us to inquire into tlle
phenomenon of crisis itself. By investigating its historical origins and reCOnSU'llcting some of
the alterations that this concept has undergone, perhaps this will bear upon crisis
1 This is, of course, only to mention a few of the most widely acknowledged of crises that we face today.
2consciousness in such a way that it will change the way we hear the term, and in turn, how
we may respond to a critical time. In Legitimatiot! Crisis, Jiirgen Habermas recalls the medical
origins of the concept of crisis, what he identifies as a definitiYe moment in the histmy of
the concept:
Prior to its employment as a social-scientific term, the concept of crisis was
familiar to us from its medical usage. In that context it refers to the phase of
an illness in which it is decided whether or not the organism's self-healing
powers are sufficient for recovery. The critical process, the illness, appears as
something objectiye. A contagious disease, for example, is contracted
through external influences on the organism...The patient's consciousness
plays no role in this; how he feels, how he experiences his illness, is at most a
symptom of a process that he himself can scarcely influence at all.2
Today we speak of the health of our time - its fitness for sm-vival. To the extent, however,
that we remain bound to this time, a significant distinction lies in the fact that this
identification remains, of necessity, a self-diagnosis; that in a time marked by crisis, one
ll1.Ust, at once, play both doctor and patient. What bearing could this insight have upon the
time in which we find ourselves today? What could this mean that we find ourselves, our
identity, claimed by crisis?
To be clainled by crisis, it seems, is to find one's identity ill crisis. The medical model
describes the critical phase as the time in which the health of the body depends solely on its
own powers of auto-irmnunization, that is, on its ability to sustain itself oyer and against
external efforts of intel-vention. In this way, the subject is implicated as one who is
responsible for acting in order to preserve itself through the crisis. A critical time may
disclose the urgency of action to dlose who are in crisis, but, inasmuch as, according to the
medicalm.odel, this diagnosis ITlay only be legitimately ITlade by an external obset-ver for
2 Jiirgen Habermas, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Legitimation Cn~ljs, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 1
3whom dle time of intervention has just past, in a time of crisis in which there is no more a
doctor than a patient, no more an outside than inside, the prospect of decision itself seems
impracticable. This perspective which entails a double-bind between the necessity and
impossibility of intel-vention not only threatens the efficacy of decision nlaking processes; it
considers the undecideability between the inside and outside opened in a critical time to pose
a palpable problem for any effective diagnosis. With this, one sees how crisis consciousness
tends to transform a time of urgency and potential change into a period stricken widl
paralysis.
As Habermas goes on to explain, the medical model fails to fully appreciate the
irreducibility of the patient's experience: "The crisis cannot be separated from the viewpoint
of the one who is undergoing it.,,3 Because the medical model of aisis gives rise to a
distinction between subject and object, inside and outside, irrespective of the experience of
dle subject who finds her identity at risk, and is therefore inappropriate to the critical time in
which we fllld ourselves, dus model must be superseded. Habermas offers acute insight into
the character of crisis consciousness in Ius analysis of the medical origins of dle concept;
however, at least in this portion of his work, he does not yet provide the means for
overcoming the antinomy he presents.
The prevailing understanding is dnt our present age is unique in its awareness of
crisis. Referring to dle ubiquity of crisis consciousness, Habermas remarked in 1973 that:
"No previous social formation lived so much in fear and expectation of a sudden system
3 Idem. Tlus is why Habermas does not consider the medical notion of crisis "social-scientifically useful."
Nevertheless, even his own concept of crisis remains, to a large extent, bound to the medical framework.
4change."4 Yet it ,vas precisely this combination of fear and expectation of inl1rllnent change
more than a century earlier which allowed Karl Marx to locate an opportunity in crisis. ~'1arx
did not let crisis consciousness remain indef.tn.ite and, hence, inu1.1.obilizing, but in reflecting
on the possibilities it opened, translated it into an injunction for action:
While the democratic petty bourgeois wish to bring the revolution to a
conclusion as quickly as possible... it is our interest and our task to make tbe
relJollltiotl permatletlt, until all more or less possessing classes have been forced
out of their position of dominance, until the proletariat has conquered state
5power...
If the proletariat, as a revolutionary subject, could "criticize themselves constantly, interrupt
themselves continually in their own course,,,6 they would be able to maintain a space free
from the congelation of tradition from which they could perpetually dissolve the
development of regressive ideology. In attempting to cultivate crisis consciousness in the
proletariat, however, Marx also found that capitalism itself was such a subject. "All that is
solid melts into air,"7 Marx declares in the "Communist lvlanifesto" of the conditions in
which alone capitalism can sustain itself - capitalism preserves itself only in appropriating
and consuming all other traditions and institutions.
In his analysis of tl1.e propensity for crisis in capitalist economy, it became clear to
Marx that capitalism not only sustained itself by constantly revolutionizing the instruments
of production, but that through periodic crisis capitalism recreated the conditions for its own
4 Jiirgen Habermas, trans. Thomas Iv1cCarthy, Legitimation Cri.fiJ·, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973),25
5 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Adelress of the Central Committee to the Communist League," in The
Almx-Engels Reader, eel. Robert C. Tucker, (New York, Norton, 1978), 505, my emphasis
6 Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Bnl111aire of Louis Bonaparte," in The Mary:-Engels Rt:adn; eel. Robert C. Tucker,
(New York, Norton, 1978), 597
7 Karl Marx, "The IvIanifesto of the Communist Party," in The Marx-Engels Reader, eel. Robert C. Tucker, (New
York, Norton, 1978), 476
5reproduction. In other words, Marx fOlU1d that crisis consciousness could be manipulated
in order to preserve tradition, but also to break with it - an insight not without relevance to
our titne in which invocations of crisis span the e11tlle breadth of the political spectmm.
Although Marx's writings provide, to my mind, the ftrst sustained reflection on the
phenomenon of crisis consciousness, far from resolving this problematic, dley have
contributed to a strain within the philosophical tradition, composed of thinkers who have
sinUlarly understood themselves to be reflecting on a critical time.
As with Marx, one can f111d in KnO/JJledge and HlIJnan Interests and Legitimation Cnsis, two
early yet significant works by Ji.irgen Habermas, distinct efforts to think the nature of crisis.
In the former work, Habermas diagnoses a "crisis of the critique of knowledge." Within the
movement of the plUlosophical tradition, particularly in Marx and Hegel's inheritance of the
Kantian critical project, philosophy has, according to Habennas, dislodged itself from the
space from which it could reliably grOlU1d epistemological claims, and ceded to positivistic
plUlosophy of science. In reconstmcting this sequence, making his way through missed
opportunities and "abandoned stages of reflection,"s Habermas seeks to recover a critical
space once open to Kant and Fichte from which to establish the interrelation of knowledge
and human interests, demonstrating that "a radical critique of knowledge is possible only as
social theory."9 In short, by returning epistemology to its roots in communicative action and
critical self-reflection, Habermas wants to locate in the dialogic relation what he calls the
"emancipatory interest of reason" - dle same critical-revolutionary dimension that Marx
sought to cultivate in the proletariat - a perspective from which "the dogmatic character of
8 Jiirgen Habermas, trans. Jeremy Shapiro, ](nol/J!edge and Human Interests, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), vii
9 Idem
6surpassed forms of domination and ideologies are dispelled ... the organization of society is
linked to decision-making processes on the basis of discussion free from domination."lo And
yet, if Habermas is able to recover this space of critical inheritance in KnGtvledge and HlltlJan
IntereJtJ only by invoking the "crisis of the critique of knowledge," it is precisely this
dimension which he puts at risk in Legitimatioll Crisis. In the latter work he asks: "how could
we distinguish ... crisis ideologies from valid experiences of crisis if social crises could be
determined only on the basis of conscious phenomena?"ll In requiring that crises permit of
legitimation, but not hinlself providing the precise criteria by which such legitimation could
be undertaken, Habermas risks both reintroducing in his own project the diagnostic problem
of the medical model of crisis and repeating the unclear gesture that the invocation of crisis
was for Marx. In this way, he inadvertently allows his project to be ovenvhelmed by crisis
consciousness. Nevertheless, in contemporary continental philosophy, Habermas is only one
among several who have inherited this problem.
Within tlle philosophical discourse, tlle problem that "the crisis cannot be separated
from the viewpoint of the one who is undergoing it,"12 that crisis occasions a sort of
undecideability between inside and outside, resurfaces. "Night is falling,"13 Heidegger writes
in his essay "rTVOztl Dichter?," warning that tlle world has fallen upon "destitute times." What
makes the time destitute is not merely the fact that beings, in forgetting tlle question of
Being, have drifted away from the ground; the time is destitute because "the traces leading to
HJ Jurgen Habermas, trans. Jeremy Shapiro, KnoJl}ledge and HtlJfldli IlitereJtJ, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971),55
11 Jurgen Habermas, trans. Thomas McCarthy, UgitiJJJdtioli Cri.17:r, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 4
12 Ibid, 1
13 Martin Heidegger, trans. "'\lbert Hofstadter, ''W'hat Are Poets For?," in Poetry, Language, Thought, (New York:
HarperCollins, 2001), 89
7that lost track are well-nigh obliterated;,,14 because we have forgotten that we have
forgotten, and in forgetting have lost the ability to recognize the age's destitution. Within
contemporary philosophy, this COllcem is not unfamiliar. Variations on this theme can be
seen in the work of Walter Benjamin, Maurice Blanchot, Emmanuel Levinas, Francis
Fukuyama and still others. In a time of crisis, philosophy has become preoccupied with its
end and its ability to diagnose a critical point beyond which intervention is impossible. To
the degree, however, that the philosophical tradition has taken as its concern the
preservation of a space of critical diagnosis it too has become penetrated by crisis
consciousness, subject to its inherent ambiguities.15 To paraphrase Jacques Derrida, to speak
~lcrisis is always to speak in crisis.16
In an interview conducted shortly after the September 11 attacks, Den-1da insists that
out "impression" of this crisis is virtually inseparable from the system which gave it form.
Accordingly, he undertakes in his essay "Autoinununity: Real and Symbolic Suicides" to lay
bare those structures conditioning our experience of trauma. Derrida goes on to suggest here
that the crisis of 9/11 can be considered symptomatic of an "autoimmnnitary" disorder -
"that strange behavior where a living being, in tluasi-s/licidal fashion, 'itself' works to destroy
14 Ibid, 92
15 Though I am not willing to generalize from these cases and claim that in the twentieth century, philosophy
has def:tnitively succumbed to crisis consciousness, I will say that these cases indicate a pattern one can trace
through key figures in nineteenth and twentieth centuty philosophy.
16 Jacques Den'ida, trans. John Leavey Jr., "On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy," in Raising the
Tone ~fPht!osophy, ed. Peter Fenves (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999)
8its own protection, to immunize itself a/!,aiIlJt its 'own' immunity."17 But because, for
Derrida, the time is always already "out of joint," always already in crisis, his account all but
liquidates the specificity of this event. In another essay, "On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic
Tone in Philosophy," Derrida, in addressing the way in which philosophy has become
immersed in a mood of quasi-eschatological speculation, continues his deconstruction of
crisis - this time exclusively with respect to the language critical appeals employ. Recognizing
that, by virtue of their lil1guistic stmcture, apocalyptic il1vocations are always vull1erable to
exploitation, Derrida calls for a critique of crisis; and yet, due to his construal of the "subject
of crisis," his injunctions remail1 only faintly audible.
In what way, then, do appeals to crisis enable something like a space of critical
diagnosis tl1at tl1e above authors desired, and, to what extent do they simply feed into a
mood which is potentially politically paralyzing? And, moreover, can there be found any
valid criterion by which this space may be legitimated and, thus, successively maintained,
despite the fact that, as Habermas notes, "tl1e media of tradition and tl1e forms of
consciousness of historical continuity tl1emselves change historically?"18 That is, even
though the identity of the philosophical tradition which has been preoccupied with crisis, is
also susceptible to mpture? If today tl1e recognition that our identity is in crisis entails tl1e
antinomy between the necessity and impossibility of intervention, I would like, in
reconstmcting tl1e philosophical inheritance of crisis consciousness, to tiT to change the way
we hear crisis.
17 Jacques Den1da, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and 11ichael B. Naas, "_Autolm1l1wuty: Real and Syn"lbolic
Suicides," in Philosopfy in a Titne a/Terror: Dialogues with Jiirgetl Habermas and.Ja'·qlles Denida, ed. Giovanna
Botradori (Clucago: Uluversity of Clucago Press, 2003),94
18 Jiirgen Habermas, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Legitimation Cnsis, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 4
9CHAPTER II
RETHINKING I\'iARX'S CRISIS THEORY
Btlt 2tJhere there iJ danger the Jm'ittgpowerJ aho grow. - Friedtich HiJJderlitr
Most critics locate what is often called Marx's 'crisis theory' within the notebooks
entitled TheorieJ q/SmpluJ-Va/iii! and volume three of Capital. Indeed, it is within these two
works that Marx most comprehensively addresses the form of economic crisis and its
precipitating causes within capitalist economy. And yet, if there is a consistent theory of
crisis to be found within Marx's C01pUS, it cannot be situated entirely within the economic
realm: it is my contention that a tlleory of crisis could only be said to emerge after
considering Marx's economic aJ well aJ his historical writings. Because it is hardly possible to
differentiate tlle economic fron1 the historical in Marx's writings with any rigor (was it not,
perhaps, Marx's greatest contribution to systematically demonstrate the unity of these two
domains?), tllese terms will be employed here somewhat loosely, to refer, respectively, to
tllose texts like Capital, focusing primarily on the more explicit economic aspects of the
capitalist mode of production, and to others, like The Eighteeltth Bt'lImaire ifLo!liJ Bonaparte,
engaged in historical analyses, but lacking immediate reference to economics in the common
parlance. If, as readers of Marx, we are confronted Witll tlle inability to distinguish between
the economic and the historical with any precision, it behooves us to extend the inquiry into
19 Friedrich H6lderlin, trans. i'v1ichael Hamburger, "Patmos," in HiJUer/in: Se!eded Verse, (Baltimore: Penguin
Books, 1961), 193
10
his concept of crisis to an analysis of other critical tropes within his work. Beyond
economic and f111ancial crises, we must look elsewhere. Even though Marx himself does not
explicitly align the historical rupture effected by revolution with economic crisis/o an
examination of the two will lay emphasis on a striking likeness tl'ley share. This affmity will
not, however, bring about a unified, consistent theory of crisis. On the contrary, our
examination will reveal that there lies a fundamental ambiguity at tl'le heart of Marx's
reflections on critical time.
§1 Crises Impossible, Possible, and Necessary
Det!}ing Crisis
In Theorie,r ~fStttpllf,r-Vallie, Marx distinguishes himself from previous economists by
attempting to give an appropriate account of crisis in capitalist economy. In the first
instance, he opposes himself to economists who are blind to the reality of economic crises.
In tllls context, Marx addresses the phenomenon of crisis as it is manifest in the form of
over-production. He cites Ricardo: "Too much of a particular commodity may be produced,
of which there may be such a glut in the market, as not to repay the capital expended on it;
Imt this cannot be the case with [...J all co1n11Jodities.,,21 Only a brief consideration, says Marx, of the
relations underlying the capitalist mode of production is sufficient to dispel such confused
20 He does, however, claim the following: "/\ new revolution is possible only in consequence of a new crisis. It
is, however, just as certain as this crisis." Karl Marx, "The Class Struggles in France," in The jVfat'X'-EngeIJ Reader,
ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: \"\1.W. Norton, 1978), 593
21 David Ricardo, cited in Karl Marx, trans. S. Ryazanskaya, Theoriu ~rStl1pluJ-Value, (l\'ioscow: Progress
Publishers, 1968), 499, Marx's emphasis
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claims. Marx points out that Ricardo's contention22 rests on the problematic assertion dut
"products are exchanged against products ... that demand is determined only by production,
or also that dellund and supply are identical."23 As he goes on to show, however, within
capitalist economy, the relations of production and reproduction are lTlanifestly othelwise:
indeed, I will suggest here tlut tlle inability to comprehend tl1.e element of surplus-value
reflects the failure of previous economists to consider the time of crisis.24
Capitalist production, for Marx, is inherently projective. It would be misleading to
say that production is driven by consumer demand, for capitalism itself creates the
conditions for such demands. In odler words, capitalist production is at once its own
reproduction: in addition to the production of commodities, it fmtst also alld ahead oftime
prodtlce the conditiotlSfor its OJ))n actilJity. To employ a somewhat simplistic example, an industrial
capitalist must attempt to ensure that she will not only receive an equitable return on her
investment (constant-capital), but also tllat she will receive more thalt e1tottgh capital to set tlle
process going once again, qfter she has received this return.25 As it turns out, however, much
is at stake in the temporality of this ajie!: namely, tlut it never simply arrives. Ratl1.er, in the
capitalist mode of production, tllls return never ceases to arrive?6 It is tlus predictive, excess
capital that Marx calls sttrplttJ-lJaltle, and it is precisely within the anticipatory structure that
22 Marx is quick to point out that Ricardo inherits this perspective from James ivfill by way ofJean-Baptiste Say.
23 Ibid, 493
24 Due to the aim and scope of this project, my analysis of crisis in I\olarx's writings will only obliquely touch on
the intricacies involved in his exposition of the capitalist mode of production. Nor will it be possible for me
here to comprehensively recapitulate Marx's analysis of crisis in capitalist economy. Rather, I will focus on the
form of crisis that Marx's economic writings provide and the temporal framework these give rise to. For a
detailed Shldy of economic crisis in Marx, see Paul Mattick's Economi,' Crisis and CtiJis Theory.
25 The capital which does ret11111, :Marx demonstrates, is never merely spent on the payment of wages.
26 As I will later explain, economic crisis does not halt, but is rather complicit in this process.
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tllls element reveals tllat he locates tlle possibility of crisis in capitalist economy. Marx
sU1l11llanzes:
But the whole process of accumulation in tlle fIrst place resolves itself into
production on an expanding JCale, wlllch on the one hand corresponds to the
natural growtll of the population, and on the other hand, fonns an inherent
basis for the phenOl1J.ena which appear during (rises. 27
As I have briefly suggested, the element of tll1.1.e, in a process driven by expansion, is
indispensible to Marx's demonstration of the possibility of over-production, and hence, to
tl1.e general "glut in tl1.e market;" and yet, there is a way in which tllls element also conceals
tlle possibility of crisis.
In supposing that "products are exchanged against products ... that demand and
supply are identical,"28 economists such as Ricardo and Say fail to recognize the
metamorphoses that these same products undergo, and in tllls way, are unable to appreciate
the stakes of tlle temporality of capitalist production. The supposition of the identity of
products of exchange and the Ulllty of supply and demand belies a conception of production
as a seamless process, and it is precisely the projective nature of capitalism tl1.at lends
credence to tllls notion. In anticipating the result of the whole process of production,
including tl1.e capital necessary to repeat this process, the capitalist assmnes tl1.at circulation
will proceed flawlessly. Indeed, tills faitll in the market promotes the kind of speculation
wlllch can, at tll1.1.es, beget astrononllcal profIt. Focusing upon the result of the projected
process of circulation, instead of what permits tllls very projection to take place, however, is
what blinds capitalism to the possibility of crisis which speculation simultaneously augments.
27 Ibid, 492, Mane's en1.phasis
28 Ibid, 493
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To locate the possibility of crisis in capitalist production, one must scrutinize its
component parts (e.g. capital, the commodity, the money form), but one must do so in such
a way as to take into account their relation to this process - that is, their metamotphoses.
Against Ricardo and Say, Marx argues: "The general nature of the metamorphosis of
commodities - "\vhich includes the Jeparatiotl of purchase and sale just as it does their unity -
instead of excluding the possibility of a general glut, on the contrary, contains the possibility
of a general glut.,,29 The metamotphosis that Marx has in n1ind here is the process he
describes at length in DaJ Kapital: the conversion the C0l111110dity undergoes from expressing
itself primarily in terms of use-value, into exchange-value, and back again into use-value.
What economists like Say miss in this process is the fact that, insofar as this metamorphosis
is time-bound, the conml0dity's value is always susceptible to val-iation, and even to
destruction. As Marx explains:
... since the circulation process of capital is not completed in one day but
extends over a fairly long period until the capital returns to its original fonn,
since this period coincides with the period within which market-prices
equalize cost prices, and great upheavals and changes take place in the market
in the course of this period, since great changes take place in the productivity
of labor and therefore also in the real valtle of commodities, it is quite clear,
that between the starting-point, the prerequisite capital, and the time of its
return at the end of one of these periods, great catastrophes must occur and
elements of crisis must have gathered and developed, and these cannot in any
way be dismissed by the pitiful proposition that products exchange for
d 30pro ucts.
There is a time in which commodities appear exchangeable - a time in which the two
moments of purchase and sale are manifestly unified; rarely, however, does this take place
29 Ibid, 504, my emphasis
30 Ibid, 495
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within the capitalist process of circulation. Rather, as I have suggested, to the degree that
this process is inherently projective, it literally capitalizes, for Marx, on the temporal
sepatation of production and COnSlli1.1.ption, even as it increases tl1.e possibility of crisis. Next,
I will show in greater detail how temporal separation and rupture are foundational for the
way in which Marx understands the form of crisis in capitalist economy.
On tbe Foro? o/Crisis
The account of the form of crisis that Marx puts forth in Tbeories ~/SJt1pltjS- VtllNe can
be seen as an attempt to enrich tl1.e critical discourse on two fronts. First, in offering a
somewhat metaphysical description of crisis, in abstraction from the concrete elements at
work in economic crises, he appears to be formulating a tlleory of the form in which crises
as such become manifest. And secondly, in mapping specific economic elements onto this
form, he endeavors to give an effective description of the way in which n-isis, or the
possibility thereof, is always latent in the vel)' structure of the capitalist mode of production.
If crisis is possible, for Marx it is always possible. Therefore, I would like, before proceeding
to Marx's conclusion that crises are, in fact, necessal)' for capitalism to sustain itself, and
hence, inevitable within capitalist economy, to pause to examine what is at stake, for Matx,
in the transition from possibility to necessity - namely, how tlns reflects the way in which he
understands the identity of the subject in crisis.
"Crisis," "Marx writes, "is the forcible establishment of unity between elements tllat
have become independent and the enforced separation from one another of elements which
15
are essentially one.,,31 Even from this vague and preliminary description, it is evident that
the crisis is inseparable from the temporality of its occurrence. As the "forcible"
reunification of elements which have ch-ifted apart, crisis is here characterized as the
revelation of a prior state of unity. The elements, Marx says, that belong together have become
independent, separate. TIlls separation has occurred over time, but also, as Marx clarifies, the
very character of this independence is principally temporal. The crisis endeavors to close the
temporal gap wlllch has opened up between these eleiTlents, restoring their prior intirnacy. In
forcibly asserting dus intimacy, the crisis reveals the temporal instability of a previously
unified identity. In other words, it is the momentary unveiling of a sort of contradiction,
pointing back to the metamorphoses that the elements have undergone. The contradiction
made apparent here in the criticalmolTlent is the separation of what seems to have belonged
together, and yet there is another side to dTe contradiction at work in crisis. Also, and at
once, the crisis is, as J'vlarx says, "the enforced separation from one another of elements
wlllch are essentially one.,,32 Not only does the crisis reveal the separation of what was one
through forcefully re-fusing these elements: dTe crisis is also the dismantling of what has
become one by virtue of that separation. There is then, a two-fold inversion in the time of
crisis: all elements constitutive of the identity in crisis are ullsetded. As the elements through
wlllch the identity coheres are shaken, the subject in crisis experiences contradiction,
becoming radically unstable.
It is unclear precisely willch elements or phases of the capitalist mode of production
Marx had in iTllnd while formulating tllls account of the form of crisis - in tllls context, he
-'1 Karl Marx, trans. S. Ryazanskaya, TheorieJ r!fSurplus-Value, (Ivloscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), 513
32 Idem
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discusses the separation of purchase and sale, the falling asunder of production and
consumption, and still others - presumably, however, all of these elements are in play in
Cl1.SeS of various sorts. Nevertheless, as was previously noted in connection with the
possibility of the "general glut" in the market, Marx understands the metamorphosis of the
conUllodity to exemplify the form of economic crisis. He writes:
The most abstractfrom ~lcrisis (and therefore the formal possibility of crisis) is
thus the metamorphosis ~lthe COIJltltodiry itself; the contradiction of exchange-
value and use-value, and furthet1Tlore of lTlOney and conUllodity, compl1.sed
within the unity of the comlTlodity, exists in metanlOlphosis only as an
involved movement.33
In the metamorphosis of the commodity, the article hitherto expressed quantitatively in
terms of its use-value, takes on another kind of value, exchange-value. The latter functions as
"a social hieroglyphic:" a way for the article to express its worth in terms common to all
other conuTlOdities. And yet, according to l\1arx's account, exchange-value and use-value
cannot peaceably coexist within the comnlOdity - each, as a distinct measure of value, is
irreducible to the other. Inasmuch as the commodity becomes such only in cile assumption
of irreconcilable elements, it is a site of contradiction. It is because the commodity is
composed of the unity of two opposite movements that Marx considers its metam01phosis
to contain the formal possibility of crisis.
As opposed to this formal possibility, the emption of economic crisis itself can be
seen in Marx's description of the antagonism between production and consumption - a
separation which I had earlier indicated to be intrinsic to the very activity of capitalism.
Because capitalist apologetics "consist in ... clinging to the concept of unity in cile face of
33 Ibid, 509
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contradiction,"34 apologists, like Ricardo and Say, are generally blind to dle non-identity of
supply and demand which is dramatically revealed in economic crises. Returning to the
exan1.ple of the industrial capitalist I earlier invoked, attempting to ensure an adequate return
on her investment, she takes an anticipatory relation to the process of reproduction. In
doing so, she supposes dlat what is consumed will remain in proportion to what is produced,
and that the reproductive process will proceed uninterrupted.35 As I previously suggested,
the projective structure of capitalist production prevents her from acknowledging the
potential rupture which the separation of production from consumption could give rise to.
That is to say, dle capitalist asserts the unity of supply and demand even as she "banks on"
their separability. Not only does the anticipatory nature of capitalist production conceal the
possibility of crisis, but as I earlier intimated, it attempts to expand surplus-value (profit
essentially gained from unpaid labor) by stretching apart the elements of production and
consumption to the breaking point. It is precisely when the unity of these two processes is
severed, Marx contends, that the crisis emerges. He writes:
There occurs a stoppage in reproduction, and dms in the flow of circulation.
Purchase and sale get bogged down and unemployed capital appears in the
form of idle money. The same phenomenon can appear when the additional
capital is produced at a very rapid rate and its reconversion into productive
capital increases the demand for all dle elements of the latter to such an
extent, that actual production cannot keep pace widl it; dns brings about a
3~ Ibid, 500
30 In volume three of Capital, Marx claims that the belief in the unity of supply and demand goes hand in hand
with the "pious wish" for capitalism to proceed on a limited scale: "All the ideas of a common, all-embracing
and far-sighted control over the production of raw materials - a control that is in fact incompatible, by and
large, with the laws of capitalist production, and hence remains forever a pious wish, or is at most confined to
exceptional common steps in moments of great and pressing danger and perplexity - all such ideas give way to
the belief that supply and demand will mutually regulate one another." Karl Marx, trans. David Fernbach,
Capital.' A Critique ~lPolitical E((if/omy, Voillme Three, (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 215
-------- --"-- - ------
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rise in the prices of all commodities, which enter into the formation of capital.36
On such occasions, the capitalist is confronted with both the imperative to sell her products
and the impossibility of doing so: in the time of crisis, the capitalist experiences the
contradiction of having to act, even as action is, for her, unfeasible. It is wid-Ull dlls
contradictory experience dlat dle violent reunification of crisis is manifest. As the
anticipatory process of circulation is interrupted, the two elements of production and
consumption are rehlfned to dleir former, dlat is, pre-capitalist, temporal proxinuty. The
crisis, in reestablishing this prior lilllty, indicates the contradictions dlat have developed with
dle capitalist mode of production, and which have elicited dle critical rupture, however, dle
crisis discloses something altogedler different to dIOse for whom the time is critical. If the
capitalist mode of production is in crisis, its identity at risk, I would like to add here dlat
those who would find themselves claimed by the gravity of dle situation are simultaneously
claimed by a conselvative injunction.
Though, as I will soon show, to the extent that dley reveal dIe contradictions
inherent to capitalist production, Marx considers crises to be, in fact, opportune; still, for all
those who would be significandy affected by these, these ruptures disclose dle task of
preselving that which is at risk: dle capitalist mode of production itself. It is evident that in
economic crisis there appears a conservative invocation - to keep whole what risks falling
apart - for in such crises, the livelihood of all dlose dependent upon dle capitalist system is
d-lteatened. What is revealed in the time of crisis is the fact that this very livelihood rests
upon the preselvation of the pel1Jetually deferred after of sU11Jlus-value, and yet, what is at
once concealed is that, widlin dle capitalist mode of production, dle activity of preservation
36 Karl }'vfarx, trans. S. Ryazanskaya, Theo17e.r ~fSlIIplttJ-Vallie, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968),494
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is not itself inconsistent with the occurrence of crises. Indeed, in distinguishing himself
from previous economists by claiming that crises are not only possible, but inevitable within
capitalism., Marx reform.ulates the way in which capitalism. can be considered a subject of
crisis. Crisis is not, for capitalism, an external factor threatening to destroy its unity; rather,
as a critical subject, the lNry identity ~fcapitalism is cowtitlfted l?J crisis.
Crises InelJitable
To catch sight of the way in which capitalism depends upon the recurrence of crises,
it is first necessary to look to what is effected through such ruptures, nam.ely, to examine
how they disrupt the capitalist mode of production. In Theories ~fSmplm- [/alue, Marx explains
that crises can be destructive in two ways: fIrst, duough the destruction of use-value, on
account of the inability to sell overproduced commodities, and secondly, in destroying
accumulated exchange-values. It is dle latter effect of crisis d1at I will be concerned with
here, for it is the equalization and dispersal of exchange-value which occur in tinles of crisis
that become, in Marx's estimation, an indispensable phase in dle development of capitalist
economy.
Widl respect to the destruction of capital brought about in economic crises, Marx
writes:
A large part of dle nominal capital of the society, i.e., of dle e:x:change-1Jaltre of
the existing capital, is once for all destroyed, although dlis very destruction,
since it does not affect dle use-value, mqy IJery much e:pedite the fmv reprodudioJl.
. . .As regards dle fall in dle purely nominal capital, State bonds, shares etc ...
it amounts only to dle transfer of wealth from one hand to another and will,
on the whole, adfavorab!J ltpOtJ reprodtfdion, since the parvenus into whose
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hands these stocks or shares fall cheaply, are 11.1.ostly more enterprising tllan tlleir
fornler owners.37
In other words, the violent reunification of the hitllerto separate elements of purchase and
sale effected through crises makes it impossible for the owner to sell her product at the price
required to sustain production on the same scale, if indeed she can sell at all. In suppressing
the conditions necessaq for reproduction to continue, tllat is, the expansion of capital, the
crisis makes possible tlle transfer of wealtll. AltllOugh the crisis makes it so that tlle previous
owner may not be able to continue to produce, for those less directly affected by tile crisis,
tllere arises an opportunity to cheaply procure the instruments of production, and in this
way, profit even more than their predecessors.38 The kernel of Marx's hypotilesis of tile
propensity for crisis in capitalist economy lies in this sentiment: "What one loses, the other
gains;"39 nevertheless, this is not merely because crises happen to benefit some opportunistic
capitalists, but, more fundamentally, that the actions of such opportunists reflect what
preserves capitalist production.
Periodic crises not only create tlle opportunity for new capitalists to make exorbitant
amounts of profit: paradoxically, they provide tlle only conditions under which capitalism
may sustain its own activity. Marx advances tills provocative thesis with respect to crises of
overproduction in the "Manifesto of the Communist Party:"
37 Ibid, 496, my emphasis
38 As Marx notes in Capital: " .. .large enterprises often flourish only under their second owners, after the first
have gone bankmpt. The second owner, buying them cheaply, starts production 'with a smaller outlay of
capital." Karl Marx, trans. David Fembach, Capital: A Ctitiqtle ofPoIitimI E('OllOtt~)!, Voltlme Three, (London:
Penguin Books, 1991),209
39 Karl Marx, trans. S. Ryazanskaya, Theories ~lStl1pltls- T/Taltle, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968),496
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It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put
on its trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the entire
bourgeois society. In these crises a great part not only of the existing
products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are
periodically destroyed. In these crises there breaks out an epidemic that, in all
earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity - the epidemic of over-
production ... The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to
comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get over
these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of
productive forces; on the other, by d1.e conquest of new markets, and by the
more thorough exploitation of old ones. That is to sqy, f?J1 ptwing the wqyfor more
extensive and more destrttt1ive crises, tlItd fry diminishing the means wherel!J ctises are
d 40pretJente.
Because dle conditions of bourgeois production are generally "too narrow to comprise the
wealdl created by them," dut is, because they are too narrow to contain the surplus-value
produced through perpehlal competition and unfettered expansion, crises emerge as
conditions supplemental to capitalist production. The crises which periodically erupt in
bourgeois society endeavor, on the one hand, to raze the very barriers 'within which the
capitalist mode of production is inscribed. And yet, on dle other hand, because they do not
aChlally put a halt to production, but on the contrary, encourage its continuation through
redistributing productive forces among enterprising capitalists, these crises must d1.emselves
be considered the conditions under which d1.e preservation of bourgeois society may be
ensured. Moreover, because they tend to "act favorably upon reproduction," capitalism has
an interest both in honing crises in order to bolster new markets, and in reproducing the
form of crisis as a condition of d1.e reproductive process.41 The crisis is, for Marx, "precisely
40 Karl Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in The lVlmx-EngelJ Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New
York: \X!.W. Norton, 1978),478, my emphasis. Let the reader also note that ivlarx reinforces the medical
resonances of crisis here in refen1ng to overproduction as an "epidemic."
41 For cOlltemporai)' examples of how capitalism has made the exploitation of crises axiomatic to the mode of
production, see Naomi Klein's excellent exposition of the destructive nature of neo-conservatism in The Shock
Doctrine: The Rise ifDLraster Capitalism.
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the phase of disturbance and interruption of the process of reproduction,"42 but, insofar as
it produces the conditions under which, on an expanding scale, capital can actualize itself, it
is also an integral part to that process.
It is not incidental that dle previous quote, in which Marx explicidy aligns crisis widl
the identity of bourgeois society, was drawn from dle "Manifesto of the Communist Party;"
for dus text addresses precisely dle same sentlllent that I have been concerned with, albeit
widun a more general fram.ework. In the same text, Marx claims that "the bourgeoisie
cannot exist without constandy revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby
dle relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society.,,43 Neither,
therefore, can capitalism exist without constantly dltowing itself into crisis. Before drawing
this section to a close, I would like to briefly indicate what Marx considers to be the upshot
of crises. As Marx lumself puts it, "in the crises of the world market, dle contradictions and
antagonisms of bourgeois production are strikingly revealed.,,44 If, dlen, dle crisis presents an
opportunity to dispel bourgeois ideology, it comes also with an injunction for revolutionary
action. Marx recogluzes widlin the identification of crises, dle capitalist mode of production
calling for its own supersession; nevertheless, dle potentially emancipatory prospect such
crises open up is again obscured by dle fact that the identity of capitalism appears
inseparable from its propensity for periodic rupture. Indeed, in the following section I will
42 Karl Marx, trans. S. Ryazanskaya, TheoneJ ~lS't!tplttJ- TTaltie, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), 503
43 Karl Marx, "JVlarufesto of the Communist Party," in The Mmx-ElIge!.r R!!adet~ eel. Robert C. Tucker (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1978),476. In a discussion leading up to this section, Marx claims on the previous page
that the "modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions :in
the modes of production and of exchange." In other words, the modern bourgeoisie produced itself through
cnses.
44 Karl Marx, trans S. Ryazanskaya, TheotieJ ofSmpllu-Value, (l\10scow: Progress Publishers, 1968), 500
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demonstrate that the kind of revolutionary praxis that Marx called for in breaking from
bourgeois society may not be inconsistent with the very activity through which capitalism is
m.aintained.
§2 The Revolution in Pe1111anence
An Epoch q/RezJoltttionary CtiJiJ
In Tht, Eighteenth Brtt1JJaire q(LoltiJ Bonaparte, an essay ostensibly engaged in a
materialist history of Louis Bonaparte's inexplicable rise to power, Marx appears to be
primarily concerned with the prospect of revolution: namely, that in the nineteenth century,
the possibility for successful revolution, as dem.onstrated by the failure of the bourgeois
revolutions of 1848, may be severely damaged. At the opening of the text, Marx fan1.ously
formulates tlus concern: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as tl1.ey
please; they do not make it under circumstances directly found, given and transnlltted from
the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a lughtmare on the brain of the
living."45 Altl1.ough it is manifest that each and evay generation is burdened by the task of
inheriting a past that is not their ovvn, but to wluch they are nevertheless in thrall, Marx
seems to consider tlus condition as particularly onerous to those living in the nineteenth
century. This has less to do, however, with the human task of becoming lustorical, than it
does with the material conditions into which, in tl1.e nineteenth century, the human is
tl1.town. "Does it require deep intuition," Marx asks in the "Malufesto of the Communist
Party," "to comprehend that man's ideas, views, and conceptions, in one word, man's
45 Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Bmmaire of Louis Bonaparte," in The jl,larx-Engels &ader, ed. Robert C. Tucker
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1978),595
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consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his
social relations and in his sociallife?"46 In other words, what Marx is concerned with here is
how the nuterial economic conditions in which the human fInds herself in nineteenth
cenhuy Europe, nan"lely, those necessitated by the capitalist nlOde of production, affect the
way in which one comes to identify herself vis-a-vis those very conditions.
If it was possible for previous generations "to make their own history," that is, to
take up the material conditions in which they found themselves, and transfotm their social
teality thtough tevolutionary means, accotding to Matx, in the nineteenth centmy, this
possibility appears particularly dubious. Marx continues:
And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things,
in creating something entirely new, precisely in such epoch.. qlrevoltftionary cn~ri..
they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow
from them~ names, battle slogans and coshl1nes in otder to ptesent tl"le new
scene of world history in tllls time-honored disguise and tllls borrowed
language.47
\Xlhen, in ptior instances of "tevolutionary crisis," revolutionaties had invoked specters ftom
the past, tlley appatently enjoyed some measure of success; such appeals "served the pUipose
of glotifying tlle new struggles.,,48 For example, Marx explains tlut Oliver Cromwell's
'glotious tevolution' in England summoned up names and imagery from the Hebtew Bible
to "magnify the given tasks in in"lagination."49 This ptactice is longer plausible in bourgeois
46 Karl Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in The jVfarx-Ellgel.r Riiader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1978),489
47 Karl I\'larx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in The jV1arx'-Engell' Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), 595, my emphasis
48 Ibid, 596
49 Idem
society - indeed, the capitalist mode of production has so thoroughly appropriated the
traditional that, rather than augmenting the prospect of historical emancipation, invocations
such as these only further entrench the human within her bourgeois existence. .l'vlarx does
not here elaborate on the way in which, as a reflection of the nuterial conditions of
bourgeois society, invocations of "the spirits of the past" preclude the possibility for
successful revolution. It is only clear that, in line with the basic tenet of historical
lTlaterialisrn, that "intellectual production changes its character in proportion as material
production is changed,"SO before society can break with its present conditions, it must be
able to free itself from the weight of tradition. The necessity of superseding these phrases,
nevertheless, becomes clearer with Marx's analysis of the failure of the 1848 revolutions.
Failing to resurrect the revolutionary spirit, the bourgeois revolutions of 1848 only
succeeded in parading around the dead bodies of those they called up. In attempting to
authenticate their cause by drawing from past revolutions, however, they inadvertently
absorbed their content. He writes:
On December 2 the February Revolution is conjured away by a card-
shal-per's trick, and what seems overtluown is no longer the monarchy; it is
the liberal concessions tlut were wrung frorIl it by century-long sti-uggles.
Instead of satiety having conquered a new content for itself, the state only
appears to have returned to its oldest form, to tlle shamelessly simple
domination of the sabre and the cowl.S!
Having called up revolutionary slogans of old, the February Revolution, Marx says, failed to
conquer "a new content for itself;" rather, in doing so, it condemned itself to the repetition
50 Karl Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in The iWaI>:-Engeis Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1978),489
51 Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Bnunaire of Louis Bonaparte," in The Marx:-Eflgels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker
(New York: W.W. NortoIl, 1978), 597
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of an antiquated political form. In other words, not only does material production directly
influence intellectual and cultural production, but Marx here afflrms the converse. Just as
material econonuc conditions delinut the horizon of thought, tlle phrases and slogans
invoked in times of revolutionaty crisis are determinant, for Marx, of tlle possibility for
transfofilUng material conditions. Louis Altlmsser's writings on ideology are helpful on tlus
point. "\\1e know that the State apparatus may survive," he writes, "as is proved by the
bourgeois 'revolutions' in ni.11eteentll-cenhlry France, by cot/ps d'etat, by collapses of tlle
State ... without the State apparatus being affected or modified: it may sUl-vive political
events wluch affect tlle possession of state power.,,52 Intellectual production, or ideology,
not only accompanies the material conditions of production: because ideology is itself
material for Althusser, by virtue of tlle fact tllat it comprises certain apparatuses and
practices, it preserves tlle donunant social reality witlUn wluch it is found.
Ifmaterial and intellectual production are reciprocally determitilng, as Althusser
suggests, NIarx's concern over the efficacy of revolution witllin the nineteenth century seem
all tlle more setious. Because tlle material econOllUC conditions of the nineteenth century,
nalTlely, those necessitated by the capitalist system, thrive off of the appropriation of the
traditional, and on account of the fact tlnt tlus mode of ptoduction is inextricable ftom its
ideological composition, the invocation of proto-capitalist ideological phrases will not
provide tlle means for overcoming tlle conditions within wmch capitalism emerged. Ratller,
52 Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," 011 Ideology, (New York: Verso Books, 2008),
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by "anxiously conjur(ing) up the spirits of the past,,53 in times of revolutionary crisis,
revolutionary activity is reinscribed within the bourgeois framework within which capitalism
became culturally sedimented. It is for these reasons that 1'Iarx concludes that "the social
revolution of the nineteentll century cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from tlle
future."54 Nevertheless, as I mentioned earlier, the activity Marx prescribes in his
revolutionary writings, for breaking with the capitalist system appears akin to the process
through which capitalism sustains itself.
~4notherCtiticalSuo/ea
In claiming that, as opposed to bourgeois society, "in COllununist society, the
present dominates the past,"55 Marx implicidy defines the task of revolutionary praxis.
Speaking figuratively of dle stance which the revolutionary of the nineteenth century must
cultivate toward dle past in order to bring about enduring systemic change, Marx writes:
tlle beginner who has learnt a new language always translates it back into his
mother tongue, but he has assinUlated dle spirit of the new language and can
produce freely in it only when he moves in it without remembering the old
and forgets in it his ancestral tongue.56
The proletarian revolution, for Marx, requires tlnt the past is, to a great extent, forgotten.
Not until the age has forgotten its historical parentage, can it begin entirely anew, and create
its own independent content. Only under this condition does it seem that revolution has a
53 Karl ivLarx, "The Eighteenth B1Umau-e of Louis Bonaparte," in The A1arx-El1gels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), 595
54 Ibid, 597
55 Karl :Marx, "Manifesto of dle Communist Party," in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1978), 485
56 Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Buunaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Tbe lvIar.x-Engel.r Reade!; ed. Robert C. Tucker
(New York: W.\X'. Norton, 1978),595
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chance of success. And yet, it does not seem as if Marx is suggesting that an entire epoch
forget its own historically shaped conditions. Not only would such an endeavor be clearly
undesirable in its inherent violence, without a selective memory of the past, dlere would be
nothing to ensure dnt the same contradictory historical conditions are not repeated after the
revolution. Soon after likening the task of historical emancipation to a kind of active
forgetting, Marx further articulates what such an undertaking would involve. The revolution,
he says,
... cannot begin with itself, before it has stripped off all superstition in regard
to the past. Earlier revolutions required world-historical recollections in
order to drug themselves concerning their own content. In order to arrive at
its content, the revolution of the nineteenth century must let dle dead bury
the dead. There the phrase went beyond the content: here dle content goes
beyond the phrase.57
What must be forgotten before the revolution may begin is not dle memory of bygone
generations, but rather the "superstitious," regressive ideologies dlese generations may have
bestowed upon the living.58 Because dle repetition of traditional ideologies was responsible,
in l\1arx's estimation, to the failure of dle bourgeois revolutions, because dlese phrases could
not be invoked without at once affecting dle content of these, the proletarian revolution may
assimilate dle spirit of the new only in striving to keep itself free from any ideological
appropriation. Even so, Marx does not provide any criteria to identify the "superstitious"
elements which the revolution must endeavor to repel. For dus reason, Marx prescribes
especially severe measures for revolutionary praxis.
57 Ibid, 597
53 }ilthough I do not think that Marx is here suggesting that the memory of the past be liquidated en masse, I
recognize that there is something undeniably violent about his injunction to "let the dead bury the dead."
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If the proletariat is to inherit, not the dead weight of tradition, but the "spirit of
revolution,,,s9 it must engage in the activity of perpetual self-criticism. Marx explicitly
articulates this requiren,ent in differentiating tl,e proletarian revolution, tl,e revolution to
come, from the failed bourgeois revolutions of the past. Here he writes:
Proletarian revolutions ... lilce those of the nineteenth century, criticise
tllemselves constantly, interrupt themselves continually in tlleir own course,
come back to the apparently accomplished in order to begin afresh, deride
with unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacies, weaknesses and paltriness of
tlleir fIrst attempts, seem to thrown down tl,eir adversary only in order tl,at
he may draw new strength from the eartll and rise again more gigantic before
them, recoil ever and anon from the indefInite prodigiousness of their own
aims, until the situation has been created which m.akes all turning back
impossible, and tl,e conditions them.selves cry out: Hie RhodttJ, hie' Jalta!O
To be successful, tl,e proletarian revolution must endeavor to create for itself a space free
from tl,e congelation of tradition - a space within which criticism is kept unaffected by the
drift of ideology and, in this way, impervious to bourgeois appropriation. In order to secure
such an inviolable ditl.1ension, the revolution must constantly interrupt its own activity; it
must, in a word, pel-petually keep the task to forget in mind. And yet, if revolutionary praxis
can be broadly construed as a disruption of the dominant social reality undertaken from
within, Marx seen:1S to be advocating here that tl,e proletal1.an revolution secure for itself its
own independent content tl,rough continual Je!fdisruption. In encountering such an
injunction, tllOugh, a question arises as to the identity of tllls subject: what kind of Jeff
inheres even tlltough perpetual self-destabilization? And, moreover, where could such a pure
space of critique be found for tllls subject to maintain?
S9 Ibid, 596
60 Ibid, 597-598
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Within the context of his historical writings, Marx identifies tllls subject as the
proletariat. Nevertheless, it seems that in describing the proletarian revolutionary task in just
tllls way, as a class whose identity is preselved through revolutionary times only in the
continual disruption of any stable identity, Marx comes upon another aitical JH~ject. The
proletariat, as tlle "only revolutionary class," is to protect its identity from any ideology
wlllch right comprorise its revolutionary content through the activity of constant self-
scrutiny. As it turns out tllough, tllls very identity, tlle content of the revolution, is projected
- recall that "the social revolution of the nineteenth centmy," for Marx, "cannot draw its
poetry from the past, but only from the futme.,,61 In other words, tlle content of tlle
proletarian revolution is perpetually deferred in the revolutionary activity of ongoing
destabilization. If, as Marx intin1.ates at the beginning of The Eighteenth BruJJJaire, one always
already find herself witllin lllstorical conditions and social relations which she has inherited
from the past, if, as Althusser suggests, drawing on the work ofJacques Lacan, identity is
itself only possible witllin an ideological framework, in times of revolutionary crisis, the very
identity of the proletariat is in nisis. In otl1.er words, tl1.e revolutionaty program that Marx
designates for tl1.e proletariat is the undertaking of continual crisis. "Above all things," he
writes in the "Address to the COllununist League:"
the worker must counteract, as much as at all possible, dming the conflict
and immediately after the struggle, the bourgeois endeavors to allay the
storm... Their actions must be so aimed as to prevent tl1.e direct
61 Ibid, 597
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revolutionary excitement from being suppressed again immediately after the
victory. On the contrary, tIJI!JI 1J11iSt keep it alive as long as possible.62
As opposed to the bourgeoisie, the proletariat must strive to keep the time criticaL Only in
drawing out the critical phase of the age, cultivating historical rupture, is a leap out of the
capitalist system even thinkable for Marx. It is strange, however, that Marx uses
revolutionary activity here as a distinguishing factor between the proletariat from the
bourgeoisie; for, as lVIarx claims in the "Manifesto of the Communist Party," "the
bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutiol1i;;jl1g the instlU11lents of production, and
thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society.,,63 As a
constlUct of the capitalist mode of production which, as I have indicated, preserves itself in
making the inevitability of recurrent crises a condition of the reproductive process,
bourgeois identity is itself in crisis.
1I1hetitil1g CtiJis
Although it is unclear whether it is possible to assimilate tlle kind of crisis I have just
identified within Marx's description of proletarian revolt to the form of crisis examined
earlier in tlus chapter, it appears that in both ms economic and Ius historical writings, Marx
has come upon a critical subject - a subject whose identity is constitutive of crisis. In looking
to ms account of capitalism's propensity for crisis, it was revealed that capitalist production
relies upon periodic crises to facilitate the ongoing expansion of surplus-value. In this way, I
suggested that crises could be invoked in order to preserve the dominant social reality-
62 Karl Marx, "Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League," in The Mar:x:-EngeLr Redder, ed.
Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), 507. The critical phase, the moment of decision in the
medical model, rather than being brought to an end quicldy, must be extended "as long as possible."
63 Karl Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in The Marx'-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1978),476, my emphasis
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bourgeois society. And, after examining the program Marx identifies as the only feasible
option left for revolutionary change in the nineteenth century - the proletarian task of
unrelenting self-intermption - it appeared that tllls critical space could not be inhabited
without keeping the identity of the revolution in perpetual crisis. In short, Marx's writings
demonstrate that crises can be honed in order to maintain the conservative social relations
and material conditions wlllch inhere in capitalist society, but also that they are indispensable
to tlle possibility of emancipation from such conditions.
Not only, though, does Marx leave llls readers with a tension in his reflections on
crisis: to tlle extent that, in botll cases - in Ills account of the progression of capitalism and
the activity of revolution - crisis was seen as the only prospect the one had of staving off the
other, he left a definite problem in llls "vake. How, tllen, does one proceed as an inheritor of
Marx? Does the apparent impasse raised by Ills crisis theory call into question the efficacy of
Marxist ideology critique, or llls analysis of the interworking of capitalist economy?
Moreover, what bearing do Marx's reflections on crisis have on we who diagnose the current
epoch as absolutely critical? I leave these questions open for the ti1l1.e being. If it is indeed
the case that something like a space ~fctitica/ r~flectiol7 that Marx attempted to inherit for the
proletariat is opened up in the time of crisis, tllat the Marxist tradition of breaking witll the
traditional is capable of being maintained without itself becoming susceptible to conservative
appropriation, in looking to the way in wlllch Jiirgen Haberlllas and Jacques Den-ida, two
would-be beneficiaries of the Marxist legacy, approach the subject of crisis, I would like to
examine where tllls leaves us today.
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CHA.PTER III
CRISES UNDENIABLE, IDEOLOGICAL
In his 1968 essay "Technology and Science as 'Ideology,"'64 Jiirgen Habermas
develops in outline the ways in which, in advanced capitalism, an effective critical social
theory nmst depart fron1 the Marxian framework. In evaluating Herbert .i\tfarcuse's clain.165
that technology and science have increasingly selyed ideological, legitin.1.ating roles in the
course of capitalist expansion, he identifies two "developmental tendencies" absolutely
critical to the analysis of modern society: (1) "an increase in state intervention in order to
secure the system's stability," and (2) "a growing interdependence of research and
technology, which has turned the sciences into the leading productive force.,,66 On the one
hand, the state has ceded its political function of legitimating economic activity, in favor of
the technical role of system maintenance, that is, of "steering" the economic system away
from impending crises.67 For Habermas, this represents an epistemic shift away from politics
as the "the realization qfpracticalgoaN' to a system geared "toward the soltttiot! qftedmical
6+ JLlrgen Habermas, trans. Jeremy Shapiro, in T021'<1rd a Rational Society, (London: Heinemann Educational Books
Ltd., 1971)
65 Habermas mostly focuses on how Marcuse develops this thesis in One-DimetlJiotlalhlatl.
66 Jiirgen Habermas, trans. Jeremy Shapiro, in Toward a Rational SociefJl, (London: Heinemann Educational Books
Ltd., 1971), 100
67 "The permanent regulation of tlle economic process by means of state intervention arose as a defense
mechanism against the dysfunctional tendencies, which threaten tile system, that capitali...m generate... wile;; left to
it,re!f" Ibid, 101
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prob!ems."68 In an apparent inversion, the economic system, according to Habennas,
becomes the state's source oflegitimation. On the other hand, the profusion of government-
contracted technological research has reached the critical point at which it has outstripped
the role of "simple," human labot to provide the economic base. Not only does this mean
that the proletariat has lost its revolutionary potential:
What seems ... more important is that it [technological advancement] can
also become a background ideology that penetrates into the consciousness of
the depoliticized m.ass of the population, where it can take on a legitll1.1.ating
power. 69
In short, the very space in which the congelation of ideology may be effectively resisted - for
Habermas, communication in ordinary language - is beginning to come under the sway of
"technocratic consciousness." As a result of these developments, Habennas argues that
"capitalist society has changed to the point where two key categories of Marxian theory,
namely class struggle and ideology, can no longer be employed as they stand."70 In his
subsequent efforts to reground critical social theory through offering a comprehensive
theory of rationality - of which 'instrumental action' (the impulse toward technical control)
and 'communicative action' (action oriented to mutual understanding) are two
corresponding components - Habermas attempts to come to grips with the new problems
of advanced capitalism.
It in his 1971 work, Knowledge and HlJlJlan In/ern/s, that he fIrst undertakes this
systematic regrounding of social theory. In retracing the process by which epistemology "has
681bid,103
69 Ibid, 105
70 Ibid, 107
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been undermined by the movement of philosophical thought itself,"71 leaving positivistic
philosophy of science in its position, Habermas endeavors to restore a dimension of self-
reflection once open to Kant, in which philosophy could lTlaintain the distinction between
scientific knowledge and knowledge as such - what I called in the last chapter, the space oj
critical r~j7ectioll that Marx sought to cultivate for the proletariat. He strives, in this way, to
revive epistemology, articulating a ground for the sciences which does not ultimately restrict
their activity to the paradigtl'l of technical rationality. Although it is undoubtedly true that
critical social theory must be reformulated in order to account for the vicissitudes of
advanced capitalism, and moreover, that such a refonnulation ought to take its lead from a
comprehensive critique of rationality, as many critics have pointed out, Habermas' own
efforts in KnotJ}ledge and Hllman Interests toward the reciprocal regrounding of the critique of
knowledge and social theory are not without crucial problems. He situates these efforts as a
response to what he calls "the crisis of the critique of knowledge" ~ in a word, that modern
science has lost contact with its roots in human activity, and has in this way disavowed the
task of legitimation through critical self-reflection. In approaching the specific
epistemological problems emerging with the advancement of capitalism through the lens of
"the crisis of the critique of knowledge," a crisis which fails to meet his own requirement to
permit of justification, 72 Habermas' efforts of 'crisis management' in KnotJ}/edge and Htftllt71Z
Interests appear not unlike that of the technician working to mallltain the stability of the
71 Ji'u:gen Habermas, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro, KnOll'/fligf and Human Interests, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 4
72 As we shall see, this is introduced in Legitimation Ct"isis.
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system - a system, moreover, which capitalism has an interest in successively
maintaining.73 On his own terms then, the former stands as a theoretical false start. Not only
tins, but also, in contributing in clUs way to tile develop1Tlent of 'crisis consciousness' as tlle
mode in wInch we relate to the world, he subnnts to the ideological "technicization of tile
life-world."
§1 The Crisis of the Critique of I<nowledge
Broadly construed, "the crisis of tile critique of knowledge" is the record of a chain
of events that has cuhlUnated in science 'forgetting' its embeddedness witInn tlle "objective
self-formative process (Bildtl11gJprozeH) of the human species,"74 and its subsequent
abandonment to the detached, pure metIlOdology of modem science. Habermas situates his
claim lnstorically: "Since Kant science has no longer been seriously comprehended by
pIUlosophy."75 TIns repression, he goes on to explain, cannot be traced to a single traumatic
event. Rather, in the movement of philosophical thought itself, namely, in the inheritance of
Kantian reflection by Hegel and Marx, the memory of philosophy's former relation to
science has drifted into obscurity. "PIUlosophy was dislodged... by pIUlosophy,"76 and the
plUlosophical approach to science has, in clUs way, regressed to a pre-Kantian stage,
effectively relinquishing its legitimatory function.
73 This seems to be, to some extent, due to the fact, already suggested in "Technology and Science as
'Ideology,'" that in advanced capitalism, critical labor receives legitimation from economically justified research;
however, I wonder if Habermas does enough, at least at this point in his work, to demonstrate how
'communicative action' and the 'emancipatory interest of reason' works counter to the interests in maintaining
the global economic system.
74 Jiirgen Habern,as, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro, Knowledge and Human InterestJ~ (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 5
75 Ibid, 4
76 Idem
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Although epistemology has been supplanted by philosophy of science through the
movement of thought,77 this has nevertheless occurred, according to Habermas, within the
orbit of a single question: "how is reliable knowledge possible?"78 In his critical project, Kant
sought to answer this question by inquiring into the subjective conditions of human
cognition. In this way, he endeavored to purify knowing of all metaphysical presuppositions,
and thus secure for human knowledge a reliable, that is, legitimate, foundation. Habermas
argues that fr011'1 tllls position an opportunity arose in wlllch Kant could have elaborated an
epistemological concept of science on the basis of human interests, and tlms held open a
space in wlllch scientific knowledge could be enduringly legitimated. With Hegel's
metacritique of Kant, however, tllls dimension was foreclosed. In the Phenomenology qfSpirit,
Habemlas contends, Hegel, in critiquing Kantian epistemology, radicalizes tlle intention of
critical philosophy: namely, to eradicate reflectively the presuppositions which detemline
how the subject of knowledge knows. Hegel tums tlle critical project on itself. By asking
how the subject can have access to the conditions of possible knowledge prior to knowing-
subjecting Kantian critique itself to tlle requirement of self-reflection - in demanding,
therefore, that critical philosophy itself possess a presuppositionless beginning, Hegel
entangles epistemology witllin a circle. Habermas writes:
For the circle in which epistemology inevitably ensnares itself is a reminder
that the critique of knowledge does not possess the spontaneity of an origin.
77 It is striking, given Habermas' work, for instance in TOJJJatd a RationalSo.iery, where he elaborates the
economic interests motivating the fOlmation of technological ideology, that here he identifies "the movement
of thought" as responsible for the growth of the technical paradigm he associates with positivism.
78 Ibid, 3
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As reflection it is instead dependent on something prior and given, which it takes
as its object while simultaneously originating in it.79
In exposing reflection as always already mediated in the very activity of mediation, Hegel
outlines the basic standpoint of phenomenology. The phen01uenologist fmds herself, in the
beginning of inquiry, already at her goal. If she seeks to deternune what occurs in knowing,
she will fmd herself as a knower, already standing in relation to that knowledge she desires.
The problem that Habermas identifies with tlus approach, and which he attributes to the
influence of Schelling's identity philosophy on Hegel, is tlnt it presupposes precisely what it
would have to prove in order to dissolve epistemology while meeting its own criteria - the
absolute relation of subject and object. In tlus way, achieving not deternlinate but, llbJtrlld
negation of the role of reflection in the critique of knowledge, Hegel "destroys the secure
foundation of transcendental consciousness, frotn wluch the a priori del1urcation between
transcendental and empirical deternlinations, between genesis and validity, seemed certain,"so
and leaves pilliosophy with an unclarified relation to scientific knowledge.
According to Habermas, "tlle crisis of the critique of knowledge," initiated by the
Hegelian uptake of Kant, is solidified widl Marx's materialist inheritance of Hegel's
111.etacritique. By reducing the process of reflection instituted by Kant to the paradigtn of
production and appropriation, Marx fmally closes off tlle ditllension of self-reflection in
which pilliosophy could mallltain the distinction between scientific knowledge and
knowledge as such. As Garbis Kortian writes in lvIetacritique:
79 Ibid, 8
80 Ibid, 19
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This reduction, as is clear in Marx's metacritical appropriation of the Phenomenology,
ends up by abandoning the concept of self-reflection because it understands
dIe transcendental concept of ret1ection in terms of the model of production.
. . .this reduction of the cognitive dimension leads to a capitulation before
. .. 81POSlt1Vlsm.
That is to say, although .Marx's materialist interpretation of synthesis, within "vhich his
conception of ret1ection is situated, is not widlOut significant epistemological import, Marx
himself, on Habermas' reading, does not recognize dIe implications of his own claims. 1Iarx,
following Hegel, understands reality to be dialectically determined by the Bil.dttng.rproze.r.r of a
subject, and yet, unlike Hegel, he equivocates on the implications of this activity. "On dIe
one hand," Habermas writes, "Marx conceives of [this] activity as a transcendental
accomplishment; it has its counterpart in the construction of a ,vorld in which reality appears
subject to conditions of the objectivity of possible objects of experience"82 - his conception
of the synthesis of humanity and 'objective nature' bears upon the field of subjective human
experience - and, "On the other hand he sees this transcendental accomplishment as rooted
in real labor processes"S3 ~ the objectivity of hmnan experience is first constituted in
concrete human labor.84
In cornprising the field of human experience and dIe stnlCtmes which fori'll human
life, labor represents for Marx, "not only a fundamental category of human existence but
81 Garbis Kortian, trans. John Raffan, IV1etaoi!ique: The Phi!osophim!At;gumen! ~tJiit;gen HabertJJtIJ, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1980), 93
82 Jiirgen Habermas, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro, KnonJ/edge and Hmmm Interests, (Boston: Beacon Press, 197'1), 27
83 Idem
84 For an example of tIus, one could point to the multiple levels upon wluch Marx's critical discourse operates:
crises appear to fit the quasi-metaphysical £01111 that .i'darx developed in TlJeo/ies ofSurp!us- T'a!ue while emerging
at the same time from material historical processes dependent on human labor.
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also an epistemological category... a schema for action tlnd of apprehending the
world ... "B5 By locating the formation of classes in concrete labor and not in the
transcendental consciousness, Habermas argues, Marx relegates the synthetic activity of the
human to instrumental action, and in so doing, closes off the din1ension of self-reflection,
the very space in which "critical-revolutionary activity" must move. If human self-formation
is thought fundamentally in terms of the paradigm of production, the reflective ability to
identify and critique congealed social relations "\-vill be compromised. B6 His inability to
distinguish between the two levels on which his discourse operates permits Marx, according
to Habermas, to overlook d1e logical distinction between the status of critique and that of
the natural sciences, leading him to call for their unity in one single, universal science. From
here, positivisn1 could inaugurate the absolutism of scientific method in a space evacuated of
reflection. Habermas concludes: "Matei1.alist scientism only reconfirms what absolute
idealism had already accomplished: d1e elimination of epistemology in favor of unchained
universal 'scientitic knowledge' - but this tin1e of scientific materialism instead of absolute
Imowledge."B7 Although Marx's philosophy of labor marks a significant advance, in thinking
Hegelian recognition in terms of class antagonism and linking social formation to material
processes, in reducing the reflection of the self-formative subject to the paradigm of
B5 Ibid, 28
86 This is because, on Habermas' reading, although Marx's social theory "does not eliminate from practice the
structure of symbolic interaction and the role of cultural tradition, which are the only basis on which power
(Herrschaft) and ideology can be comprehended... this aspect of practice is not made part of the philosophical
frame of reference." Ibid, 42
87 Ibid, 63
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production, on Habermas' view, his thought indicates a corresponding regression, sealing
off the opportunity opened up by Kant to found a reflective theory of knowledge.88
N everdleless, "dIe crisis of dIe critique of knowledge" is not merely a lament for
prospects lost in the movement of tradition: it is an assessment of dIe damages sustained by
dIe foundation of the sciences in this injury, a diagnoJiJ of what consequences would follow if
these damages were to go unnoticed, and implicidy, a program for recovery.89 While trying to
evade the dangers of scholastic dogmatism, that is, dIe risk of founding epistemology upon
unquestioned metaphysical presuppositions, the dleory of knowledge unwittingly yielded to
anodler form of dogmatism - the dogma of scientism espoused by logical positivism.
Habermas writes: "Positivism stands and falls with the principle of scientism, that is that the
meaning of knowledge is defmed by what the sciences do and can thus be adequately
explicated dlrough the methodological analysis of the scientific procedures.,,9o In taking up
residence upon the collapsed space of reflection, positivistic philosophy of science founds
itself in defiance of the call to reflect upon its own activity. It is precisely this dogmatic
disavowal of reflection and corresponding unquestioned belief in the pure methodology of
modern science which Haber111as designates as "pre-Kantian."
88 Habermas later goes on to say that Nietzsche, in radically calling into question the activity of reflection on
the basis of Hegel's metacrit.ique of Kant, finally dissolves the dimension of reflection. Yet, because he does
not identif)r any additional consequences this might have on the foundations of modem science in his narrative
of the "crisis of the critique of knowledge," it is unclear how Nietzsche figures into this account.
89 These latter elements of "the crisis of the critique of knowledge" can be compared to what Seyla Benhabib
called the "explanatory-diagnostic" aspect of C1'itique. Seyla Benhabib, Critiqtle, Norm) and Utopia: A SttICfy ~rt/;e
FormdationJ' ~lCritiml Theory, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), 226-227
90 Jiirgen Habermas, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro, KnOJvledge and Human lttfere,11J, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 67
42
What cannot be gathered by way of scientific inquiry, what transcends the confines
of the rules to which it is bound, including even the attempt to justify the validity of
scientific knowledge, is regarded by the philosophy of science as meaningless, metaphysical
abstraction. In this way, replacing transcendental conditions of inquiry with rules of
procedure, the philosophy of science renounces the task of identifying the meaning of
knowledge, detaching it from the knowing subject. As Habermas puts it: "For an
epistenlOlogy restricted to methodology, the subjects who proceed according to these rules
lose their significance. Their deeds and destinies belong at best to the psychology of the
empirical persons to whom the subjects of knowledge have been reduced.,,91 Once the
knowing subject has been dislocated from the process of knowing and rejected from the
position of one through whOln a world is constihlted in coming to grips with 'objective
nature' (and thus, as one for whom scientific knowledge would have any purchase), one can
no longer speak of a 'theory of knowledge,' but only a 'methodology of research.' Although
this may sound like an insignificant semantic distinction, this denominative shift captures
n'luch of what is at stake for Habermas in his account of "the crisis of the critique of
knowledge."
A 'theory of knowledge,' is a mode of inquiry which takes its way of knowing - al1d
tbe Jegitimary q{rtI(h kllOlVillg - as its foremost concern, attempting in this way to preserve a site
from which it can retlect upon its own activity. 'Methodology,' on the other hand, is a
specific procedure by which a field of study engenders knowledge. Questions as to the
legitimacy of a particular method tend to lie outside of the framework of methodological
inquiry. If, as Habermas suggests, "the crisis of the critique of knowledge" entails that
91 Ibid, 68
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epistemology is replaced by a 'medlOdology of research' advocated by positivist
philosophy of science, and if the accession to power of dle latter effects the exile of the
knowing subject from the cognitive process, an opporhmity arises in which dle
autochthonous modern sciences could develop unchecked. \'X/hat ultinlately concerns
Habermas about dle dominance of the positivistic self-understanding of dle sciences can, to
some degree, be viewed as analogous to what Marx predicts in the GrttndriJJe with respect to
capital:
FL'l:ed capital, as an animated monster, objectifies scientific thought and is in
fact the encompassing aspect. It does not relate to the individual worker as
an instrument. Instead he exists as an animated individual detail, a living
isolated accessory to dle machinery.92
Nevertheless, to the degree that, on his diagnosis of late capitalism, technological research
entrenched within the framework of positivist science becomes the leading force of
production, dle relationship Habermas envisions here between capital and technology is not
merely an analogous one. Indeed, why "the crisis of the critique of knowledge" is absolutely
critical, is because it discloses the possibility of a point beyond which any effective critique
of technological ideology is conceivable.
Positivism, in cutting off the sciences from the only dimension in which they could
possibly find justification and maintain the validity of their findings, gains complete control
over scientific self-understanding, and restricts the latter to technical rationality. As l1lomas
McCarthy argues, "The real problem is not technical reason as such but its expansion 'to the
92 Karl :Marx, trans. :Martin Nicolaus, GlYlnd"iJJe: FoundationJ ofthe Ctitique qlPolitimlEconomy, (New York:
Penguin Classics, 1993), 470
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proportions of a life form, of dle 'historical totality' of a life world.",93 This totalizing self-
understanding as technical progress, Habermas explains, precludes self-reflection and so
lapses into dogmatis1Tl in covering over the embeddedness of knowledge in the interests of
the knowing subject.
In his analysis of Peirce and Dildley, Habermas identifies moments in which the
dogmatic "illusion of objectivism" could have been overcome and a self-reflective theory of
the sciences founded, however, he also finds within each, hidden positivist tendencies
preventing them from doing so. Nevertheless, it is Habermas' identification of the
knowledge-constitutive interests driving dle pursuit of knowledge, exposed in his readings of
Peirce, Dilthey,94 and Freud that finally allow him to articulate what is called for in
superseding the "crisis of dle critique of knowledge." I\kCarthy SU1TI1Tlarizes: "Technological
rationality lTlUSt be assigned its legitimate, if limited, place within a cOlnprehensive theory of
rationality. It is for this task that the theory of cognitive interests is designed."95 Before the
growing mound of discarded knowing subjects and missed opportunities, "the crisis of the
critique of knowledge" identifies not only the possibility of the irrevocable repression of dle
interrelation of knowledge and hU1l1an interests, but within this identification it delineates a
program to make whole what has been broken.
Habem1as wants to return to the dimension opened by Kant and Fichte in which,
over and against the knowledge-constitutive interests he identifies in the natural and cultural
93 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theo1)' ofliirgen Habermas, (Boston: MIT Press, 1985), 67
94 Although Habermas' analysis of Peirce and Dilthey is essential in the development of the book, due to the
scope of this discussion, I will only treat them here obliquely.
95 Idem
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sciences with Peirce and Dilthey (respectively, the technical and practical interests),96 he
identifies an emancipatory interest on the basis of the experience of reflection. Habermas
writes: "Methodically it [the emancipatofJ' interest of reason] leads to a standpoint from
which the identity of reason with the will to reason freely arises. In self-reflection, knowledge
for the sake of knowledge comes to coincide with the interest in autonomy and
responsibility."97 In the experience of reflection developed by Fichte, Habermas locates a site
from which the confluence of knowledge and interest could be elaborated methodologically.
He realizes, however, that this dimension cannot be recovered in the "mere return" to an
opportunity available before the positivistic colonization of epistemology: "On the basis of
positivism, an unmediated return to this ... would have to appear as a regression to
metaphysics."98 For this reason, Habermas turns to Freudian psychoanalysis, a mode of
incluiry which understands itself as empirical science, in order to show how the interest of
reason - the "critical-revolutionary" dimension of reflection - reemerges from out of "the
crisis of the critique of knowledge," providing an opportunity to restore the damaged
relationship between philosophy and science.
Habermas identifies psychoanalysis as an example of the way in which science in its
vefJ' activity self-consciously moves in dle space of self-reflection, albeit the onlY example. I
would like, therefore, to suggest that the method that Habermas develops throughout the
96 "Thus we speak of a technical or practical knowledge-constitutive interest insofar as the life structures of
instrumental action and symbolic interaction perform the meaning of the validity of possible statements via the
logic of inquiry in such a manner that, to the extent that these statements are cognitions, they have a function
only in these life structures: that is to the extent that they are technically exploited or practically efficacious."
Jiirgen Habennas, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro, KnoljJledge and Human Interests, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 195-196
97Ibid, 197-198
98 Ibid, 197
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course of Kn02vledge and HtIlnan hztereJtJ can be understood as an application of a version of
Freud's method of analytic reconstmction through general interpretation; an application,
neverdleless, which turns out to be ultimately problematic. As opposed to dle hermeneutics
of the cultural sciences,
Psychoanalytic interpretation... is not directed at meaning structures in the
din1ension of what is consciously intended....The omissions and distortions
that it [psychoanalytic labor] rectifies have a systematic role and function.
. . .The mutilations have meaning as such.99
Freudian psychoanalysis posits a dimension subtending the conscious level of the patient's
discourse: the unconscious. In dle unconscious is preserved rejected lTlemories and unmet
desires - fragments of a life history abandoned. Evidence of what the subject has been
unable to face or fulfill is belied by the manifestation of symptoms; the return of the
repressed. The omissions and distortions present in the analysand's speech testify to the
analyst "places \'vhere an intelpretation has forcibly prevailed dlat is ego-alien even dl0Ugh it
is produced by the self. 100 The task of the analyst then is to release the analysand from the
entanglement of self-alienation through self-reflection.
In contrast to dle monological model of interpretation employed in dle cultural
sciences, psychoanalytic general interpretation proceeds through the formation of mutual
understanding between two partners in a communicative situation. As Habel1llas puts it:
"This disturbance of communication does not require an interpreter who mediates between
partners of divergent languages but rather one who teaches one and the same subject to
99 Ibid, 217
100 Ibid, 227
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comprehend his own language."101 The general interpretation of the analyst enables the
analysand to pursue her own emancipation by leading her to reflection. The analyst
accomplishes the former by way of reconstruction, that is, by attempting to establish continuity
in the analysand's life history by supposing a sort of logic to function behind her distorted
communication. The Slll:ce,r,r qlthi,r recol/,rt17ldioJl, according to Habet'JJ/{lJ~ cem be determined b)1 the e.\~teJZt
to lvhid7 the afla!ysalzd flOt onlY accepts the iflte!pretatiofl q/the (lfla!yst, but OtllY i11Jq!ar m the re{wlstn/diMl
retHrm to herfragments ofher lije histo~y, rdeming her to the continuation ofseif-refledion. Haberm.as
sU11Ullanzes:
The analyst instructs the patient in reading his own texts, which he himself
has mutilated and distorted, and in translating symbols from a mode of
expression deformed as a private language into the mode of expression of
public communication. This translation reveals the genetically inlportant
phases of life history to a memory that was previously blocked, and brings to
. h IfI:' 10?consclOusness t e person's own se -lOt1native process. -
It is in the translation performed in general interpretation that Habermas locates the
confluence of knowledge and interest. The self-reflection that psychoanalysis engenders is
both enlightenment el1ld emancipation. General interpretation, in releasing the analysand to
her self-formative process, accomplishes the reunification of the subject with her alienated
identity, and so restores her conununication through conununicative action. In this way,
Habermas understands psychoanalysis to function self-consciously as "at once both theOl']'
and therapy."l03 He thus locates within the psychoanalytic model a site from which to
101 Ibid, 228
102 Idem
103 Ibid, 287
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critically intervene upon "the crisis of the critique of knowledge" through the discovery of
the emancipatory interest of reason.
The analytic method of reCOnSU1Jction that Habermas atu1hutes to Freud has
striking afftnities with Habern1.as' own method which he employs in Kllolt'ledge and Human
IntereJ1J. In Habermas' diagnosis of "the crisis of the critique of knowledge," one can clearly
detect a therapeutic address: Philosophy has repressed the dimension of self-reflection in
which it nevertheless 1l1.0Ves. In order for it to rehabilitate its self-alienation (embodied by
philosophy of science's compulsive ftxation within the paradigm of instrumental action and
its correlative inability to understand its knowledge claims within. the context of
communicative action) within the narrative of its self-constitution, it must recall and work
through what effected this repression. TIns, in turn, is accomplished by n1.eans of Habermas'
method of rational reconsuLlction. Like the physician who "confronts the process that he is
to reconstruct not as a lnstoricalmatter but as a power operating in the present,,,104
Habermas considers his activity of reconstruction capable of undoing the hold that the crisis
retains over the present. As Habermas himself identiftes in ills interpretation of
psychoanalytic method, however, successful reconstruction can only be rendered legitimate
by the patient. Within Knowledge and Human IntereJtJ~ Habermas, through ills reconstruction of
the movement of philosophy from Kant through Freud "takes the scattered elements of a
mutilated and distorted text and fills them out to make a comprehensible pattern;,,105 and yet,
without the accord of the sll!:jed in crisis, at best, his interpretations remain hypotheses, ins
interventions tentative, and at worst, mere monological correctives. Before further
104 Ibid, 231
105 Ibid, 230
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explicating how Habermas' own explicit engagement with the concept of crisis elsewhere
renders his project in Knowledge alld Human Interests to reground critical social theory,
problematic, I would like to underscore that in deyeloping "the crisis of the critique of
knowledge" through the psychoanalytic paradigm, he seenlS to haye reyerted to the medical
roots of crisis.
§2 Legitimating Crisis
In the opening of his 1973 work, Legitimation Gisis, Habermas situates his
contributions to crisis theory vis-a-yis Marx's preyious efforts:
Marx developed, for the fIrst time, a social-scientifIc concept of system crisis;
it is against this background that we speak today of social or economic crises.
When, for instance, we mention the great economic crisis of the early thirties,
the Marxian oyertones are unmistakable. But I do not wish to add to the
history of Marxian dogmatics yet another elucidation of his crisis theory. My
aim is rather to introduce systematically a social-scientifIcally useful concept
of crisis.106
Although the Marxian schematic has been invaluable to the critique of capitalist political
economy in deYeloping the theoretical resources for analyzing the stnlCtural signifIcance of
the periodic recurrence of economic crisis, Habermas suggests that, with the widespread,
systemic transformation effected by advanced capitalism, Marx's thesis of the ineYitability of
crisis may have lost its coherency. Legitimation Gisis thus sets out to answer the following
question: "Is the fundamental contradiction of the capitalist social formation effective in the
same way under the forms of appearance of organized capitalism, or has the logic ofcrisis
cbmtgerR"107 In accord with his conclusions in "Technology and Science as 'Ideology,'" here
106 Jurgen Habennas, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Legitimation G'JiJ, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 2
107 Ibid, 31, my emphasis
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Habermas fInds that certain developmental tendencies of advanced capitalism present new
diffIculties for critical social theory. Nonetheless, if 'the logic of crisis' has changed,
Legitimation Crisis does not provide adequate means for re-conceptualizing dlls phenomenon.
Rather, in abandoning crisis to the lacuna between two asymptotic theoretical approaches,
Habermas leaves us with a concept dlat resists all efforts of legitimation.
\Xlith the radical reconfiguration of the relationship of the economy and the state
effected by advanced capitalism, several factors crucial to Marx's crisis theOi)! are altered.
Thomas McCarthy identifIes two of these:
(1) Governmental activity has altered the form of dle production of smplus
value; by filling functional gaps in the market, dle state intervenes in the
process of capital accumulation. It heightens dle productivity of labor
dltough dle production of "collective commodities" (material and immaterial
infrastructure) and through organizing the educational system in general, and
scientific-technical progress in particular... (2) In certain large sectors of the
economy dle mechanism of dle market has been replaced by "quasi-political
compromise" between business and unions in deternllning dle cost of labor
power. Since the cost of labor power is the unit of measme in the Marxian
calculation of value, dlls introduces a political dimension into the very
. 100foundations of value dleory.
As we saw in the previous chapter, it was only within dle time of suq)lus-value that
economic crisis was possible for Marx: widl the augmentation of surplus-value came an
increased crisis potential. Now, however, as the state takes on the function of regulating dle
accumulation of capital, transformations in dle dissellllnation of surplus-value have
transposed its struchlIal significance. Moreover, if as Habermas suggests, shifts in dle
capitalist "principle of organization" have pemlltted the repoliticization of the relations of
production, it is no longer clear that crisis tendencies can be analyzed solely through an
10811lOmas McCarthy, The Critical Theory ofJiirgen Habet71Jas, (Boston: MIT Press, 1985),363-364
51
economic lens.109 Not only though, do these developments disclose for Habermas the
obsolescence of Marxian crisis theory; in his estimation, the metamorphosis of the politico-
economic couple characteristic of advanced capitalism leads to the possibility of entirely new
crisis phenomena - among these, crises of legitimation, rationality, and motivation. 110
Nevertheless, rather than offering a descriptive account of the crisis tendencies Habermas
identifies within the development of advanced capitalism, I would like to examine from a
methodological perspective the way in which he attetnpts to rethink the nahue of cl1.sis.
Habermas recognizes that within the social sciences the systems-theoretic concept of
crisis is among the most widely used. Accordingly, in evaluating this approach, he indicates
some crucial factors which he thinks this paradigm has neglected. He explains, quite
schematically, that Cl1.Ses al1.Se in systems theory "when the sttucture of a social system
allows fewer possibilities for problem solving than are necessary to the continued existence
of the system. In this sense, crises are seen as persistent disturbances of ijJtem irttegmtion."I11
Because this paradigm considers social groups as fundamentally auto-regulatory, the
possibility of crisis - that which threatens the very regulation through "vhich the system
sustains itself - emerges necessarily beyond the system's constitutive logic. For systetl1s
109 Habermas offers a list of some of the various ways that the state intervenes on the economy and affects the
accmnulation of capital: " -through 'strengthening the competitive capability of the nation' by organizing
supranational economic blocks, securing international stratification by imperialist means; -through
lIDproductive government consumption (for example, annaments and space exploration; -through guiding, in
accord with struchlral policy, the flow of capital into sectors neglected by an autonomous market; ..." Jiirgen
Habermas, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Legitimation Crisis, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 35
110 AldlOugh Habermas' formulation of these systems crises lies beyond the scope of this chapter, I would like
to suggest here that it is possible to classify "the crisis of the critique of knowledge" found in KtioJlJ/edge and
Human Interests as one of socio-culhlrallegitimation. For my part, I ,,,ish to indicate that these "possible crisis
tendencies" seem to remain firmly widun the systems-dIeOIetic paradigm. For Habennas' own articulation of
dlese, see Legitimation Ctisis, especially 45-94.
111 Jiirgen Habermas, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Legitimation Ctisis, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 2
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theory, crises come from lvitbollt, and yet it is evident that they bear upon the social system's
internal cohesion. Thus, crisis is thought here as the inability to preserve identity in
encountering resistant heterogeneity. It is precisely, however, this notion of identity that
Habermas contends renders the systems-theoretic approach social-scientifically ineffective:
systems theory is unable to thin.k the 'internal causes' of crises,112 indispensable in
considerin.g the Jocialz!J; of the system. He writes:
Structurally inherent contradictions can, of course, be identified only when
we are able to specify structures iJ:nportant for continued existence. Such
essential structures must be distinguishable from other system elements,
which can change without the system's losing its identity. The difficulty of
thus clearly determining the boundaries and persistence of social systems in
the language of systems theory raises fundamental doubts about the
usefulness of a systems-theoretic concept of social crisis. ll3
Systems theory, in a word, cannot adequately distinguish the limits upon which its crisis
theorems nevertheless rely. Social systems may encounter elen1.ents foreign to the
composition of system integration, problems which question the identity of these systems
without risking fragmentation; indeed, as Habetn1.as points out, social evolution (the process
in which the external is progressively assinUlated) can be essential to system maintenance. l14
If systems theory equivocates on the way in which social identity is comprised, for
Habermas, this belies a further inability to think the appropriate JtI!:jec:t ~f c:riJzs. He concludes
his analysis of the limitations of the systems-theoretical concept of crisis with the following:
112 \X!e could count among the internal crisis factors the systems-theoretical approach cannot sufficiently
account for the IvIarxian notion of class antagonism.
113 Ibid, 2-3
114 Some of tl1e 'external constituents' Habermas considers to be "universal properties of social systems include
"outer nature, or the resources of the non-hlUl1an environment" and "tlle otller social systems with which tlle
society is in contact." Ibid, 9
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The range of tolerance within which the goal values of a social system can vary
without critically endangering its continued existence or losing identity
obviously cannot be grasped from the objectivistic ~viewpoint of systems
theory. Systems are not presented as subjects; but, according to the pre-
technical usage, onlY subjects can be involved in nises. Thus, onlY when members
qlcl society e.'<:jJerience stmctuml altemtions as aiticalfor continued existence Clndjl,e/ their
, I 'J 'I d k 01' ,,115sot/a ~ tumtt(y tlJreatene can we spea 0 ensts.
Parallel to Habermas' critique of positivistic philosophy of science in KnOlvledge and HUllJan
Intere,rt,r, because systems theory disavows the perspective of the human subject, it falls short
of presenting a "social-scientifically useful concept of crisis," It is for this reason that he
takes recourse to the insights of the phenomenological tradition.
Whereas systems theory lnay be helpful in examming a social system in terms of the
"steering problems" it may encounter in performing its auto-regulatory function, in insisting
that "the crisis cannot be separated from the viewpoint of the one who is undergoing it,"116
Habermas argues that the critical diagnosis offered by the forlTler approach must be
supplemented by one which is capable of addressing the "life-world" within which crisis is
experienced, "Societies are aIJ-o systems," he writes
but their mode of development does not follow solely the logic of the
expansion of system autonomy (power); social evolution transpires rather
widlin the bounds of a logic of the life-world, the structures of which are
determined by linguistically produced intersubjectivity and are based on
criticizable validity clain'ls.117
Though the "steeling mechanisms" necessary for "system integration" can be tracked with
dle systems-theoretic paradigm, to the degree that such controls (and the problems to which
they are intended to negotiate) move widlin dle symbolic sphere of communication, the
115 Ibid, 3, my emphasis
116 Ibid, 1
117 Ibid, 14
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latter appears conceptually inappropriate. Accordingly, Habermas suggests that a social-
scientific concept of crisis should be able to ret1ect the phenomenological dimension of
sociality, such as that proposed by Alfred Schutz. The latter, drawing from Husser!, locates
intersubjectivity as the fundament of "lived experience." If our basic way of being in the
world is a social-being involving communication in ordinary language, an account of the
composition of social identity cannot dispense widl dle intersubjectively structured
standpoint of the social subject. Habermas dms considers dle "logic of the life-world"
absolutely essential for crisis theory. And yet, systems theory is not the only paradigm which
will ultimately run into problems attempting to present an appropriate account of crisis. "A
contemporary consciousness of crisis," he writes
often turns out afterwards to have been misleading. A society does not
plunge into crisis when, and only when, its members so identify the situation.
How could we distinguish such crisis ideologies from valid experiences of
crisis if social crises could be determined only on dle basis of conscious
phenomena?118
Though Habermas directs these comments to the medlOd of historiography, they dearly
have implications for the phenomenological paradigm. Here his assertion that "the crisis
cannot be separated from the viewpoint of the one who is undergoing it,"119 comes back to
haunt hinl: if it is the case dlat the "lived experience" of the JtI!:ject qfa7SiJ is irreducible for
any critical diagnosis, and yet, if it is also dear dlat some of dlese diagnoses are ideological
(dunk, for instance, of dle 2009 outbreak of "swine flu" in N ordl America), a concept of
crisis based solely upon "conscious phenomena" appears less dun rigorous. Furdler1110re, as
118 Ibid, 4, my emphasis
119 Ibid, 1
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I indicated above, crisis has been encumbered with diagnostic problems ever since its
medical employment:
The critical process, the ilhless, appears as something objective. A contagious
disease, for example, is contracted through e"'>:.'tema! influences on the
organism...The patient's consciousness plays no role in this; how he feels,
how he experiences his illness, is at most a symptom of a process that he
hinlself can scarcely influence at all. Nevertheless, we would not speak of a
crisis, when it is medically a question of life and death, if it were only a matter
of an objective process viewed from the outside. 120
The crisis is manifestly objective - an external force disrupting the subject's autonomy;
however, inasmuch as it puts at risk the vety ability to maintain a normative state of health - a
stable identity - the crisis inheres on the side of the subject. Moreover, because the terminus
of crisis is linked to the "liberation of the subject caught up in it," tlle reclamation of her
personal sovereignty, the diagnosis of crisis remains auto-diagnostic. In its subjectivism, the
"life-world" perspective resists the demand for objective validation; but additionally, as with
systems tlleoty, it also fails to yield tlle possibility of collectively legitimating crises. As I
suggested previously, within the medical framework, crises can be legitimately diagnosed
only from without - tllat is, by one whose identity is not already claimed by that crisis she is
to diagnose. Unless a crisis concept can wrest itself from the diagnostic problems posed by
the medical model, tllat is, if such a concept is unable to rigorously delllTut the normative
boundaries which tlle crisis unsettles, its utility will remain questionable.
Recognizing tlle apparent shortcomings of both models, Habermas nevertlleless
reaches the conclusion tllat a useful concept of crisis sh01..-tld be sought in combining tlle two
approaches. "A social-scientifically appropriate crisis concept," he writes" "must grasp tlle
120 Idem
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connection between system integration and social integration. The hvo expressions 'social
integration' and 'system integration' derive from different theoretical traditions.... Both
paradigms, life-world and system, are important. The problem is to demonstrate their
interconnection.,,121 In failing to demonstrate this interconnection, however, Habermas
leaves us with an empty concept of crisis. Even if he were able to synthesize the insights of
systems theory and social phenomenology, he would still need to demonstrate how
combining the two approaches would allow one to overcome the diagnostic problem they
both inherit from the medical modeL If it is impossible to defme within each of the two
paradigms the boundaries of the JlJl:ject qfctiJiJ, it seems unlikely that the fusing of these
would amount to much more than further obfuscation. By way of conclusion, I would like to
reflect these methodological concerns back upon Habel11.1aS' diagnosis of "the crisis of the
critique of knowledge" in KnolJ1!(?(~geami H1t111al1 InlereJtJ.
Though the concept of crisis in Kn01J1!edge and HlJmal1 IntereJtJ appears "pre-technical,"
this fact will not redeem the legitimacy of his project. Rather, his proto-technical treatment of
crisis demonstrates the way in which, all efforts to the contrary withstanding, his endeavors
serve to reinforce crisis consciousness. Above, I invoked an affmity between Habermas'
method of rational reconstruction in Kl101vler{p,e and Human IntereJtJ, and what he calls in the
same work, analytic reconstruction through "general interpretation." This, in turn, led to the
conclusion that the likeness betrayed a methodological commitment to the medical model of
crisis. I would now like to suggest that, if we consider Habermas' critical intervention in that
121 Jltigen Habennas, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Legitimation Crisis, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 4
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work, as an instance of what would later become the "life-world" perspective,122 then (1)
the latter appears not quite as resistant to technicization as he might have supposed, and (2),
his diagnosis of and intervention upon "the crisis of the critique of knowledge," through
which he attempted to reground critical social theoq, seen1. not only theoretically suspect,
but indeed, ideologically regressive.
I would have the reader recall what, in his reading of Freud, Habermas took to be a
potential advance for the "theoq of knowledge:" in the psychoanalytic situation, the
subject's liberation is effected through the activity of critical self-reflection elicited in an
intersubjective, communicative context. Here crisis phenomena tied to subjective
consciousness is averted by communicative action. If, as Habermas contends, out of the
psychoanalytic paradigm emerges the dimension of critical self-reflection which could allow
philosophy to reestablish its position vis-a-vis the sciences, it is because "the cure" in
psychoanalysis - the restoration of critical self-reflection ~ is dependent on intersubjective
legitimation. In attempting to apply a version of this method to "the crisis of the critique of
knowledge," however, several c1LlCial questions arise. As there is no clear empirical subject of
crisis in Knowledge and H1l1llCtn Intere.rt.r, of what use here is the concept of intersubjectivity?
Does tllls fact release Habermas of IllS requirement that crises must in this way be
legitimated? By what criterion, after all, ought "the crisis of the critique of knowledge" be
validated?
122 Though Habermas distances himself to some extent in KnOlllledge and Human IntereJtJ from the cultural-
henneneutical approach of Dilthey, to the degree that the psychoanalytic "general interpretation," on his
reading, is an instance of an emancipatory activity taking place '.N1.thin the sphere of commwllcation free from
domination, in which societal repression can be measured by the analysand's relation to language, the fonner
appears closely allied '.N1.th the social-phenomenological approach.
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As neither Kn02v/edge and Human Interests nor LegitimCltion Crisis provide the means to
definitively answer questions such as these, through the lens of the latter work, Habermas'
diagnosis of "the crisis of dle critique of knowledge," by which he situates his efforts in dle
former work to reground critical social dleory, appears illegitimate. Moreover, in applying his
reconstructive technique to dlls perceived crisis without reference to any other subject
through whom dle efficacy of his attempts may be intersubjectively validated (as in
psychoanalytic reconstruction), his critical intelyentions in the former work appear indistinct
from the corrective techniques which, in the context of systems theoty, he criticized as
excessively objectivistic. Far from transforming the relationship between philosophy and
science, Habermas merely attempts to "steer" the epistemological ground of modern
technology away from inuninent danger. To dle extent dlat, as he recognizes elsewhere, in
advanced capitalism, technology has become dle leading productive force, in striving to
maintain the stability of dle latter, next to Marx, for whom economic crisis presented a
possibility for the dissolution of ideology and revolutionaty praxis, Habermas' critical
intervention here appears sonlewhat conservative. Finally, if Habermas' treatment of crisis is
methodologically ambiguous, at a certain point, dlis ambiguity may run counter to some of
the overarching intentions of his work: widl an irredeemable concept of crisis, crisis ideology
dovetails into the technological ideology Habermas has so often criticized.
If the developmental tendencies of advanced capitalism require Marx's critique of
political economy to be jettisoned, elements of his crisis theory, nevertheless stand up to the
test of time. Even in the age of globalization, crisis remains capitalism's manna: quite
recently we have seen how crises can be manipulated to legitimate private economic interests
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over the overwhelming exigencies of the public.123 That we understand ourselves as living
in a time of crisis takes on a new meaning in Habermas' analysis of advanced capitalism - it
supports the claim that increasingly we relate to the world as subjects who defer political
power to the authority of scientific technicians, rather than as practicallY-Ofiented subjects
who participate in decision-making processes irreducible to technical appropriation.
Habermas' contribution to our current study, then, is that he tacitly identifies the necessary
depoliticization which is effected tltrough the production of crisis consciousness. If for
Marx, the diagnosis of crisis setved the function of the critique of ideology - today it is the
reverse: the diagnosis of crisis seems to setve ideological purposes.
123 For a wealth of material examples, see Naomi Klein's important work, Tbe Sbock Dodnne: Tbe Rise olDisaster
Capitalism.
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CHAPTER IV
SPEAKING OF CRISIS
In an interview soon after the attacks of September 11 2001, Jacques Derrida made
the following comment:
.A.s with so many other crucial juridical notions, what remains obscure,
dogmatic, or precritical does not prevent the powers that be, the so-called
legitimate powers, from making use of these notions when it seems
opportune. On the contrary, the more confused the concept the more it
lends itself to an opportunistic appropriation. 124
Though he makes this clallTl with reference to the abuse of the phrase "international
terrorism," the comment captures something essential to his response to the events of 9/11
recorded in "Autoimmunitv: Real and Symbolic Suicides." It exemp.lifies the way in which, as
.. .
a critical moment in the hegemony of Western capitalism, these events disclose for Derrida,
at once, dIe necessity and the impossibility of diagnosing the full extent of their impact upon
this system. \Vhile Derrida takes very seriously the significance which the date September 11
holds for all of those families claimed by this event, and, indeed, condemns the perpetrators
of these violcnt acts unequivocally, hc nevcrthcless finds something very curious about the
way in which it has come to sif,l11ify for us "a major event," and even a historic crisis. 125 He
124 Jacques Derrida, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and rvIichael B. Naas, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic
Suicides," in Philo.roplJ)! itt a Tittle ~fTerrot:· DialogtteJ with Jih;gett HabmnaJ attd]acqtteJ Derrida, ed. by Giovanna
Borradori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 103-104
125 Earlier in the interview Derrida uses the language of crisis with respect to the identity he takes to have been
put at risk in the September 11 th attacks: "And it is vety much a question of the still enigmatic but also ctitkal
essence of this hegemony. By &Titiml, I mean at once decisive, potentially decisionary, decision-making, and itl
aiitj': today more vulnerable and threatened than ever." Ibid, 88
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insists that our experience of such an event is always inseparable from its construction and
dissemination - that an event such as 9/11 is only ever "major" (or, I would add, critical) to
thc extent that it preselttJ l'tJei!as such to thosc who it would claim. Although Dcrrida's
argument here appeals to a discourse of disaster, this is not the focus of his essay. He did,
however, endeavor to deconstruct the rhetoric of the crisis through the lens of what he
II d " l' J' . hil h "J?6' f 1 R dca e a new y ansen apoca yptlC tone 111 p . osop y, - 111 an essay 0 t le sam.e name. ea
togcthel', thesc two essays provide the basis fot a deconstructivc cl'itique of cl'isis.
Nevcrthelcss, while it appears that Dcrtida is endorsing a critique akin to that which I have
tried to articulatc here, I argue that, because of its methodological comnutment to "the
philosophy of the subject,"127 deconstructive criticism is powerless to transform crisis
consciousncss into collcctive political activity.
§1 The Experience of Traumatism
After learning that both Jiirgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida were in New York
City just weeks after 9/11, Giovanna Borradol'i artanged to interview the two, hoping to
solicit their reflections on a time manjfestly marked by terror. 128 Early on in Detrich's
interview, he is asked to evaluate the event's historical significance. "September 11,"
126 Jacques Derrida, trans. John Leavey, Jr., "On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy," in &iJing the
Tone ofPhilosoph}': Late Essays by IJJllttatlttei Kattt, Tmtt{formative C1itiqNe 0J Jacques Dertida, ed. Peter Fenves
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993)
127 Seyla Benhabib considers the following four attributes characteristic of dle "philosophy of the subject:" "(a)
the unitary model of activity, (b) the model of a transsubjective subject, (c) history as the story of
transsubjectivity, and (d) the identity of constihlting and constituted subjectivity... " Seyla Benhabib, Critiqtte,
Nom;, alld Utopia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 54
128 Pbi/osop!!) itt a Time qfTerror: DialoglJes nJitb .fijlJ!,ett Habermas atldJacques Der/ida, ed. Giovanna Borradori
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003)
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Borradori writes, "gave us the impression of being a mqjor elJen!, one of tl1e most important
historical events we will witness in our lifetinle ....,,129 Responding to this provocation,
Derrida endeavors to lay bear the "impression" which 9/11 left upon us all:
"Sornething" took place, we have tlle feeling of not having seen it coming,
and certain consequences undeniably follow upon the "thing." But this very
thing, the place and meaning of tllls "event," remains ineffable, like an
intuition without a concept, like a unicity with no generality on the horizon
or with no horizon at all, out of range for a language that admits its
powerlessness and so is reduced to ptonouncing mechanically a date,
repeating it endlessly, as a kind of ritual incantation, a conjuring poem, a
journalistic litany or rhetorical refrain that admits to not knowing what it's
talking about. We do not in fact know what we are saying or naming in this
way: September 11, Ie 11 septellJbre, September 11.130
Septenlber 11 presented to us, Derrida says, "something" unrecognizable, "something"
unprecedented - it gave us an "impression" which we did not know how to receive. On Ills
account, the experience of 9/11 was manifest as the retreat of knowledge; not only the
knowledge of what had occurred, or tllat of what possibilities had in tllls way been disclosed
- in exlllbicing "something" "beyond language" the crisis emerged as inseparable ftom tlle
perception of powerlessness it provoked. For Derrida, tllls "impression" was most palpable
in speaking of the event. Though it is clear that the gravity of such an event dictates a very
specific lexicon - a vocabulary reserved for the absolute worst - as Derrida contends, what
the event announced was precisely the insufficiency of language to make sel1Se of what struck
us as most critical. It was "impossible not to speak on tllls subject,,,m Derrida notes, and yet,
129 Jacques Derrida, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and lVIichael B. Naas, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic
Suicides," in Philo.roply itl a Time q(Terror: DialoglJe.r JlJith Jiir;gert Haberma.r andJ"'·qlle.r Dertida, ed. Giovanna
Borradori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 85
130 Ibid, 86
131 Ibid, 87
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with nothing to say, such speakin.g in.evitably lapsed in.to the mechanical repetition of dle
date "September 11." Derrida's reflections here are made with reference to his own
"impression" of 9/11; this "il1.1.pression," however, is meant to bespeak the more
fundamental structures which condition our experience of crisis, and, moreover, those
specific to eArperience as such in the age of globalization.
In maintaining that it is impossible to reduce our "impression" of 9/11 to the "bmte
fact" of its occurrence, Derrida suggests d1.at any understanding of this event must be sought
in looking to dle system which deemed it a "major event." "Whether this 'impression' is
jllstified or 110t," he says,
it is in itself an event, let us never forget it, especially when it is, though in
quite different ways, aproperlY global ~flect. The "impression" cannot be
dissociated from all the affects, interpretations, and rhetoric that have at once
reflected, conu1.1.U1ucated, and "globalized" it, from eveiJdling that also and
first of all fonned, produced, and made it possible. [...J We could say that d1.e
impression is "informed," in both senses of the word: a predonlinant system
gave it form, and dlis form then gets run dltough an organized information
maclline (language, communication, rhetoric, image, media, and so on). This
informational apparatus is from dle veiJ outset political, technical,
. 132
econolll1c.
Because deconstruction entails a methodological comnutment to the inherent semantic
instability of all discourse, it would seem misguided perhaps to insist upon distinguislling
between the various levels upon which Derrida's COl1.111.1.ents here are operative. Neverdleless,
to get to what is at stake in his essay, I think it helpful here to do just this. In speaking of the
"impression" wluch 9/11 left us widl, Derrida moves widlin dle Kantian dichotomy of the
transcendental and empirical. He suggests at once dlat the acute trauma of 9/11 revealed
something originary about d1.e structure of human expel"ience, but also that this same
132 Ibid, 88-89, my emphasis
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experience had been thoroughly conditioned by an "informational apparatus" of our own
making. On the one hand, the specificity of this particular event indicates something of the
transcendental structure by which we come to experience the event as such:
although the experience of an event, the mode according to which it affects
us, calls for a movement of appropriation (comprehension, recognition,
identification, description, determination, interpretation on the basis of a
horizon of anticipation, knowledge, nanung, and so on), although tius
movement of appropriation is irreducible and ineluctable, there is no event
worthy of its name except insofar as this appropriationfalters at some border
or frontier. 133
The subjective inappropriability of 9/11 discloses for Derrida the radical indeterminacy
intrinsic to our experience of any event "worthy of its name." But, on the other hand, our
"impression" of 9/11, he claims, is completely inseparable from the empirical, hegemonic
interpretive schema through which it was disseminated and given over to us. An irreducible
difference, according to Den-ida, inheres between the mediatized "impression" "\ve were
made to receive through a process of cultural appropriation and the inappropriable factical
occurrence of tills event. Although it is, for Derrida, "just about impossible ... to distinguish
the 'brute' fact from the system that produces the 'information' about it,"134 to the extent
that each and every event is, to a certain degree, an "event of appropt-iation," he insists that
tius distinction is one that nevertheless must be made - especially when it comes to a crisis
of such apparent gravity as 9/11.
Although he deems it necessary to rigorously distinguish between dle event and the
interpretation with which it has emerged, Derrida maintains that it is "just about impossible"
133 Ibid, 90
134 Ibid, 89
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to do so. In making this claim, he seems to be constructing a transcendental argument.
Just as, for Kant, "intuitions without concepts are blind,"135 in a quasi-Kantian fashion,
Den-ida suggests that the cl-isis of 9/11 cannot be reduced to its bare occurrence without, at
once, disavowing its sense, including its very status {/j' event. At the same time, however, it is
clear that Derrida's argument is empil-ically informed. Those who counted 9/11 a "major
event" (that plurality of individuals I have referred to as a collective "subject of crisis"),
would be hard-pressed to fully extricate thell,selves from the intel-pretive schema within
which this diagnosis was determined. In inquiring into why 9/11 seems to have outshone
many other events with a comparable, or even, a substantially larger death toll (for instance,
the estimated 800,000 murdered in Rwanda less than a decade prior), he discusses the
phenomenon of "accreditation." He suggests that in connection with disparities such as
these, we must consider "the intel-preted, intel-pretive, informed in,pression, the conditional
evaluation that makes us be!ie1Je that tlus is a 'major event.' Beliif, tlle phenomenon of credit
and of accreditation, constitutes an essential dimension of the evaluation, of tlle dating, indeed,
of tlle compulsive inflation of wmch we've been speaking."136 Playing on the Latin root
credere, "to believe," Derrida claims that evaluations of disaster are always in thrall to a global
system of credit. His emphasis on tlUs tenllinology suggests tlnt he regards the "inflated"
degree of trust invested in the West to be less a matter of loyalty, than a socio-econonUc
135 Immanuel Kant, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Tbe Crttiqm OfPttt'e Reason, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 193, A 51
136 Jacques Derrida, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and j'vfichael B. Naas, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic
Suicides," in Pbilosopl!J' ill a Time ofTerror: DialogueJ witb jiit:gell Habermas andJacq14es Derrida, ed. Giovanna
Borradori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 89
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necessity.137 According to Derrida, it is precisely because those claimed by 9/11 were
literally imJeJted in what was targeted in these attacks - the owlit of the Western, Democratic,
Capitalist system - that tlus event has had such ovelwhehning sigluficance. It may seell'l
somewhat intuitive that those who felt most dlreatened by 9/11 would be inclined to
sensationalize tl'le significance of tllls event, but Derrida takes tlus even furdler. "What is
therefore threatened?" he asks.
Not only a great nm'l'lber of forces, powers, or "dUngs" that depend, even for
tlle most deternUned adversaries of tlle Ulllted States, on the order that is
more or less assured by this superpower; it is also, more radi{'al(y Jtill (and I
would underscore tlus point), tlle system of interpretation, the axiomatic,
logic, rhetoric, concepts, and evaluations tllat are supposed to allow one to
mmprebe1ld and to explain precisely something lik:e "September 11." I am
speaking here of the diJ{'oltr.,e that comes to be, in a pervasive and
overwhehning, hegemonic fashion, a{'{'redited in the world's public space.138
September 11 was absolutely critical, for Derrida, not because it threatened the safety of US
citizens, not even because it put at risk Western nulitaty or econolluc hegemony. Ratl'ler, in
his estimation 9/11 was critical because, in demonstrating to us our "powerlessness to
comprehend, recognize, cognize, identify, name, describe, foresee,,139 what had occurred in
these attacks, it revealed the contingency of the entire dotn1nant "hermeneutic apparatus,,140
137 Credit, Denida suggests, must be understood in a double sense: "credit in the sense of fl11ancial transactions
but also the credit granted to languages, laws, political or diplomatic transactions. The United States holds this
credit, for which everyone - indudll1.g those who are trying to ruin it - feel tl1.e need, and it shows it not only
through its wealth and its technoscientific and military power but also, at the same time, through its role as
arbitrator in all conflicts, through its dominant presence on the Security Council and in so many other
international institutions." Ibid, 94
138 Jacques Denida, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas, "Autoinlmunity: Real and Symbolic
Suicides," in PbiloJopb)' ill a Time ofTerror: Dialogue!' witb Jiir;gell HaberttJa!' mid jacqtleJ Derrida, ed. Giovanna
Borradori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 93
139 Ibid, 94
140 He fleshes out this last point in the following: "No, it was not onlY all that but perhaps especially, through all
that, the conceptual, semantic, and one could even say hermeneutic apparatus that might have allowed one to
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of the West: 9/11 overloaded the critical-diagnostic capacity essential to the system of
credit upon which much of the world depends.
An AtltoiJJlIJltllZita~1!Crisis
Even though he provides nothing here in the way of formal criteria for the legititl1.ate
assessment of events like 9/11, the impossibility of evaluating whether and to what extent
9/11 was a "major event," nevertheless, indicates, for Derrida, the presence of another crisis.
He contends that "there is no event worthy of its name except insofar as this appropriation
falters at some border or frontier;"141 and yet, in doing so, he seems merely to be substituting
one diagnosis for another. In eluding critical assessment, and withdrawing from
appropriation, 9/11 displayed symptoms of an "autoimmunitary" disorder142 - "d1.at strange
behavior," he explains, "where a living being, in quasi-slticidal fashion, 'itself' works to
destroy its own protection, to inu1.mnize itself agaimt its'own' inununity." [43 He descl1hes the
fIrst moment of this process as it emerged with 9/11:
not only is the ground, that is, the literal fIgure of the founding or foundation
of dus "force of law," Jeel? to be e)posed to aggression, but the aggression of
wluch it is the ol::ject (the oi::jed e:x.poJed, precisely, to violence, but also, "in a
see coming, to comprehend, interpret, described, speak of, and name 'September 11' - and in so doing to
neutralize the traumatism and come to tenus with it through a 'work of mourning.' 'IX/hat I am suggesting here
might appear abstract and overly reliant on what seems like a simple conceptual or discursive activity, a
question of knowledge; it is as if I were in fact content to say that what is terrible about 'September 11' what
remains 'lllfinite' in this wOlmd, is that we do not ktlOJIi what it is and so do not know how to describe, identify,
or even name it. And that is, III fact, what I'm saylllg." Ibid, 93-94
141 Jacques Derrida, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and lYllchael B. Naas, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic
Suicides," ill PN/osop!?y itt a Tittle ofTerror: Dia/ogl#s with .fiirgett Haberttlas aIJdIacqtleJ Derrida, ed. Giovanna
Borradori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 90
142 The medical origllls of crisis are just as evident here as elsewhere.
143 Ibid, 94
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loop," to its own cameras in its own interests) from forces that are apparently
without any force of their own but that are able to find the means, through
ruse and the implementation of high-tech knowledge, to get hold of an
American weapon in an American city on tl1.e ground of an American
. 144
atrport.
In exposing the insuHiciency of "accredited" forms of diagnosis, sensationalizing and even
"globalizing" this exposure, Derrida suggests, the autoimmunitary subject contributes to its
own diJcreditillg while attempting to protect itself.145 He does not, however, limit his account
of autoimmunity to symbolic acts of suicide - Derrida includes in his analysis the very real
violence which occurred on September 11. Invoking the prehist01Y of these attacks, Den-ida
reminds us that "the Unites States had in effect paved the way for and consolidated the
forces of the 'adversary' by training people like 'bin Laden', [...J and by first of all creating
the politico-military circumstances that would favor their emergence and their shifts in
11 · "146fI I' ha eglance. e c all1.1.S, moreover, t at
if the organized perpetrators of the "September 11" attacks are themselves
among those who benefit from this so-called globalization (capitalist power,
teleconullunication, advanced technology, the openness of borders, and so
on), they nonetheless claimed to be acting in the name of those doomed by
globalization, all those who feel excluded or rejected, disenfranchised, left by
the wayside, who have only the means of the poor in this age of globalization
(which is, today, television, an insttument that is never neutral) to witness the
spectacle of the offensive property of others.147
1+1 Ibid, 95
145 "It is this process, the putting-a-part-of-itself-to-death in order to stay alive," Haddad writes, "that Den'ida
names auto-immunity." Samir Haddad, "Den'ida and Democracy at Risk," Contretemps no.4 (2004),
http://www.usyd.eclu.au/contretemps/4september2004/haddad.pdf
146 Derrida mentions here "the alliance with Saudi Arabia and other Arab Muslim countries in its war against
the Soviet Union or Russia in Afghanistan;" though he adds that "one could endlessly multiply examples of
these suicidal paradoxes." Jacques Derrida, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas, "AutoimmlUuty:
Real and Symbolic Suicides," in Philosophy in a Time ~lTenYJr: Dialogttes /pith Jih;gen Habermas andjat'qtteJ Den'ida, ed.
Giovanna Borradori (Chicago: University of Clucago Press, 2003), 95
147 Ibid, 122
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Not only is it the case that the attacks were made possible by actions taken by the US in
the Cold War: because those claiming to act in the interest of the victims of globalization -
the apparent pelpetrators of 9/11 - profited fron'l this development, they cannot, according
to Derrida, be isolated from the "global system" they intended to damage. This is not to say
that the victims of globalization cannot be rigorously distinguished from its would be
beneficiaries - such an equivocation would surely be a vulgar misappropriation of
deconstruction.148 Rather, Det11da is suggesting here that because the mYl1ad conditions
informing the event cannot be effectively disentangled, it would be misleading to claim that
the attacks were made either in the interest or against the interest of the victims of
globalization. And yet, if it is evident that in the age of globalization an autoimmunitary
cusorder cannot be localized to the West, that according to its very logic, autoimmwuty
contests the same borders it is meant to secure - implicating precisely what claims to be
beyond its reach - to what entity may we diagnose tlus self-destructive process? \'Vhich
subject is III crisis here?
Looklllg to the various forms in wluch the notion of autoll'lUnwuty is malufest
witllin Derrida's C01pUS, Samir Haddad argues in "Derrida and Democracy at Risk"149 tllat,
in accordance with "La Raison du Plus Fort,,,150 the subject of autoimmwutary crisis
described in "Autollnmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides" is none other tl'lan democracy
148 As Derrida asserts elsewhere: "For this witness there is no other witness: there is no witness for the witness.
There is never a witness for the witness." Jacques Derrida, trans. Outi Pasanen, "Poetics and Politics of
Witnessing," in Sot'ereignties itt Question: The Poeti,:. ~rPalti Glan, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 83
149 Samir Haddad, "Derrida and Democracy at Risk," Contretemps no.4 (2004)
http://www.usyd.edu.au/contretemps/4september2004/haddad.pdf
150 Jacques Derrida, "La Raison du Plus Fort (Y a-t-il des Etats Voyous?)," T/~yol1 (paris: Galilee, 2003)
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itself. While I grant Haddad that the existence of democracy is certainly at stake in the
9/11 interview, as I demonstrated above, because it put at risk not only a single form of
governn1.ent but also, as Derrida indicates, "the system of interpretation, the axiomatic, logic,
rhetoric, concepts, and evaluations that are supposed to allow one to comprehend and to
explain precisely something lil-.;:e 'September 11,",151 I fInd his construal of the
autOllmlUnitary subject unduly narrow. My own contention is that, for Derrida (to play on
his famous dictum), there is nothing olltside the crisis. 152 The subject of autoimmunitaq crisis is
not merely one subject among others; it is the subject of Derrida's philosophy. Although
Derrida would lilee to maintain that the irruption of 9/11 revealed the existence of an
empirical autoimmunitary subject produced by the same forces which propel globalization,
his description of the logic of autoimmunity seems rather to implicate a transcendental
subject imported from the philosophy of history. Because, as Derrida contends, the
autoirnmunitary movement of Septernber 11 threatened "the very pos.ribiliry ~l{/ world and of
any worldwide effort [mondialiJCltion] (internationalla\'v, a world market, a universal language,
and so on), what is thus put at risk by this tem/yilll!' autoimmunitaty logic is nothing less than
the existence of the world, of the worldwide itself.,,153 As this line reveals, it is not
democracy, but in fact "the world" to which Derrida ascribes the autollm1.lmitary crisis. It is
not only, however, the earth and the sum of its inhabitants that this conditions places in
151 Jacques Derrida, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and l"'Iichael B. N aas, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic
Suicides," in Pbilosopl!J' ifl a Time ofTerror: Dialogues witb Jiit:gefl Habermas atldJacqttes Derridtl, ed. Giovanna
Borradori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 93
152 The reference is to the line: "Tbere is flotbiflg otttside tbe text." Jacques Dert-ida, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak, OfGral!JtJltltology, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997),158
153 Jacques Derrida, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic
Suicides," in Pbikisopl!J' ifl a TiffJe ~lTerrot; Dialogues iJJitb jiiJ:gefl Htlbermas andJacque>' Dft'Jida, ed. Giovanna
Borradori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 98-99, my emphasis
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jeopardy: the logic of autoirnmunity, Derrida asserts, puts at risk thepOJJibili~y ofa world-
the crisis spans the empirical as well as the transcendental. Like the pham7akotl, or so many
other deconstructive tropes, "both self-protecting and self-destroying, at once remedy and
poison,"lS4 the logic of autoimmunity is constitutive of one and the same subject; however,
in collapsing once again the distinction between the empirical and transcendental, Derrida
obscures the subject of crisis. Thus, what might appear in another context as theoretical
undecideability emerges here as practical indecision.
Derrida is concerned above all in "Autoimmunity" with our ability to recognize, that
is, to critically diagnose our current condition. Nevertheless, whether or not the theoretical
framework he provides actual1y allows for such a diagnosis - much less an intelvention -
remains unclear. Articulating a case for the necessity of philosophical reflection in a time of
crisis, Derrida raises the following concern:
... and here's another paradox...because of the anonynlOus invisibility of the
enemy, because of the undetermined origin of the terror, because we cannot
put a face on such terror (individual or state), because we do not know what
an event a/the unconscious orfor the unconscious is (though we must
nonetheless take it into account), the worst can simultaneously appear
insubstantial, fleeting, light, and so seem to be denied, repressed, indeed
forgotten, relegated to being just one event among others, one of the "major
" 'f .. , f 155events, 1 you will, m a long cham of past and uture events. .
To find oneself in crisis, in other words, is not necessarily to recognize the situation as
absolutely perilous. Neither, therefore, is the recognition of crisis sufficient to motivate
critical response. "Yet all these efforts," he continues, "to attenuate or neutralize the effect
of the traumatism (to deny, repress, or forget it, to ,get owr it) are but so many desperate
154 Ibid, 124
155 Ibid, 99
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attempts. And so many autoimmunitary movements. Which produce, invent, and feed the
. h l' ,,156 ~rl ff 1" .1;, . . 1velY lnonstroslty t ey caml to overcome. . :lose eorts c aml1ng to l..Ull11n1S 1 or
surmount the effect of the crisis, he argues, must be considered suspect .- the defensive
movements of the autoimmunitary process evidently assume the most ingenious forms. But
what of those actions legitimately taken to overcome the crisis? Are they too but the
convulsions of one and the same subject? And the philosophical response, he argues, the
crisis necessitates?15! Because he holds that it is "just about impossible ... to distinguish tlle
'brute' fact from the system that produces the 'information' about it,"158 and because he is
committed to the notion tllat the crisis puts at risk precisely tlle means to diagnose the time
as critical, Derrida seems to leave no room for such responses or interventions. What, then,
becomes of tlle content of Derrida's appeal? Can his call for a critique of crisis be considered
a practical political injunction? Or do Derrida's invocations, like those of Habermas, shut
themselves up witl1in tlle tomb of philosophical soliloquy? Derrida does not take up these
questions here; however, in striving to deconstruct appeals to crisis in "On a Newly Arisen
Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy," he gives us a better idea of how to evaluate tlle political
efficacy of his invocations.
156 Idem, my emphasis
157 "Such an 'event,' surely calls for a philosophical response. Better, a response that calls into question, at their
most fundamental level, the most deep-seated conceptual presuppositions in philosophical discourse. The
concepts with which this 'event' has most often been described, named, categorized, arc the products of a
'dogmatic slumber' from which only a new philosophical ret1ection can awaken us, a ret1ection 011 philosophy,
most notably on political pbjlosophy and its heritage." Ibid, 100
15S Ibid, 89
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§2 The Subject of Eschatological Discourse
Responding to the charge that he had "takcn on an apocalyptic tone and put fonvard
1 . 1 ,,159, h' k 'r" 'd d k . "0' N 1 A .apoca yptrc t 1emes 111 is own wor , ,Jenl a un crtacs 111 n a, cw y [\.rlsen
Apocalyptic Tonc in Philosophy" to deconstruct the philosophical discourse on crisis. He
situates his efforts here vis-a-vis Kant's earlier denunciation of the "superior tone"
philosophers of his time were wont to use, claiming that he intends to "mitne in citation but
also to transform into a genre, and then parody, dcport, deform the well known title of a
perhaps less well-known pamphlet of Kant, Von Cinell? nCtlcrdings crhobcnen vomehmen Ton in del'
Phi/osop!Jie."1611 In "On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy," Kant criticizes those
thinkers who attempt to shroud philosophical activity within a plume of incense, believing
tl1emselves "to be in possession of intellectual intuition."161 Kant argues tl1at while these
philosophers have ears to hear the voice of reason (dictamen rationiJ), tl1ey nevertheless cling
to "some sort of feeling" (Gefiibl) by which they "vish to ground knowledge of the
supersensible. Curious about what motives may be harbored within their invocations, Kant
treats these writers with suspicion. Kant, Derrida \vrites, "brings to judgmcnt those who, by
the tone they take and the air they give themselves when saying certain things, place
philosophy in danger of death and tell philosophy or philosophers the imminence of their
159]acques Derrida, trans. ] ohn Leavey, ] r., "On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy," in RaiJillg the
Tone ofPhiloJoplJ)!; Late EJJa)'.f ~y I'llllh1ftt,e1 Kant, Traniformatil!e Critiqtte /~J' JacqJleJ Derrida , ed. Peter Fenves
(Baltimore: The]oh115 Hopkins University Press, 1993), 160
160 Ibid, 122
161 Immanuel Kant, trans. Peter Fenves, "On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy," in Raising the TOile
qrPhilo.f0p~y; L7te EHqyJ ~ Immalluel 10.71It, Trall~lonnative Ctitique ~ JacqueJ Derrida , ed. Peter Fenves (Baltim,ore:
The]olms Hopkins University Press, 1993), 51
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end.,,162 Mimicking Kant's essay, Derrida endeavors in his essay to pass judgment upon
those who, in announcing the eschaton, diagnose the time as critical. As in the
"Auto1nulllUUty" essay, Det11.da has nusgivings about such appeals, and accordingly, strives
to deconstruct the apocalyptic tone. Finally, in motioning toward the linuts of
demystification, Derrida provides us the means to appraise the political potential of his
critique of crisis.
Suspicious of the way in wluch Kant casts Ius Cl1.tique, Derrida inquires into the role
tone plays in the philosoplucal mystagogy of which he disapproves. "By what is a tone
marked," he asks:
a change or a rupture of tone;) And how do you recognize a tonal difference
within the same corpus? What traits are to be trusted for analyzing tlus, what
signposting [J-zgllalt:ration] neither stylistic, nor rhetorical, nor evidently
thematic or semantic? Thc extremc difficulty of this question, indeed of tllis
task, becomes more acccntuated in the case of philosophy. Isn't the dream or
the ideal of philosophical discourse, of philosophical address [allocl/tion], and
of the writing supposed to represent that address, isn't it to make tonal
difference inaudible, and with it a whole desire, affect, or scene that works
(over) the concept in contraband? Through what is called neutrality of tone,
philosophical discourse must also guarantee the neutrality or at least the
imperturbable serenity that should accompany tlle relation to the true and the
universal.!63
To criticize the tone of philosophy, Derrida points out, is necessarily to betray philosophy's
own atonal self-understancung. Philosophy wants to reinforce the truth and universality of its
claims through inhabiting a tone of neutrality; however, as Derrida indicates, to speak
,:vithout accent, in±1ection, or affect is itself an unphilosophical dream. If such an ideal
162 Jacques Derrida, trans. John Leavey, Jr., "On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy," in Raising the
TOIle o[Pbilosophy: Late Essqys by ImmaJltlel Kaftt, TraftsjortJIative Critique l!y.!acqlJes Dem'da, ed. Peter Fenves
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 124-125
163 Ibid, 122
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philosophical language were possible, it would only be so by virtue of that elelnent of
desire philosophy wishes to dismiss. In other words, a tonal analysis, according to Derrida, is
just as misguided \vith respect to its aims as it is to its own feasibility. Nonetheless, this does
not lead Derrida to renounce his own analysis of the apocalyptic tone in philosophy ill toto,
but only to recognize its necessary limits and presuppositions and, most importantly, its
I · 1 . If 164reation to anguage ltse .
Similar to the way that the il1:1pression of 9/11, he argued, was informed by an
"organized information machine... political, technical, economic,"165 Den'ida wants to
suggest here that our perception of tone is always conditioned by factors which appear to
exceed it. And yet, because the apocalyptic tone is used in such widely differing contexts,
such motivating factors are even less easy to identify than those which mediate our
experience of trauma. Always sensitive to the way that our most basic impressions are in
thrall to conditions withheld from our grasp, Kant endeavors to detelnune what motivates
those philosophers inhabiting the superior tone. As Derrida points out, however, Kant
remains committed to the notion, in this context, that these factors are tied to subjective
intentions:
Kant is sure that those who speak in this tone expect some benefit from it,
and that is what will first interest me. \X'hat benefit? What bonus of seduction
164 On this point, he adds: "\'\7hile still remaining in the Kan6an axiomatic, as it were, we can already infer from
this that no hann would have happened [ani/le], no mystagogic speculation would have been credible or
efficient, nothing or no one would have detoned [ditotlll~ in philosophy without this errance of the name far
from the tlling, and if the relation of the name philosophy to its orig:inary sense had been 1nsured against every
accident." Ibid, 126
165 Jacques Derrida, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and :i'v1.ichael B. Naas, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic
Suicides," :in Philosophy in a Time ojTenm:' Dia/~gtles Ivith Jiirgen Habermas alldJacques Derrida, ed. Giovanna
Borradori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 89
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or intimidation? What social or political advantage? Do they want to cause fear?
Do they want to give pleasure? To whom and how? Do they want to terrify?
To blackmail? [Faire (hanter~ To lure into an outmatching in enjoyment? Is
this contradi.ctory? In view of what interests, to what ends do they ·wish to
come with these heated proclamations on the end to come or the end already
li h J,,16Gaccomp s enr
Kant is sure, says Derrida, that the phenomena of tone can be explained by recourse to the
intentions of the addresser; Derrida, on the other hand, is not so certain. Though he does
not make this point explicitly, a sense of incredulity seems to emerge with the litany of
questions to which he subjects Kant's tl1esis. 1G7 What reasons, after all, could one elaborate
to account for a tone of voice? Consistent with his position in the 9/11 interview, Denida
does not entirely abandon here the intuition tl1at private interests may underlie a discourse
dead set on announcing the end of an era.1GB Nonetl1eless, he takes his own analysis in
anotl1er direction, interrogating tl1e language that such critical appeals employ.
Derrida begins his analysis by elaborating tl10se characteristics he takes to be
paradigmatic of apocalyptic discourse: "Among tl1e numerous traits characterizing an
apocalyptic type of writing [eeril], let us provisionally isolate prediction and eschatological
preaching [predictllion], the fact of telling, foreteUing, or preaching the end, the extreme limit,
the imminence of the last." 169 Within this delirnitation, he identifies several variants -. the end
166 Jacques Derrida, trans. .Iohn Leavey, Jr., "On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy," in &iJing tbe
Tone ojPhilosoph)': Late Esserys~)' Immanuel Kant, Tram/orlilative Critique by Jacques Denida, ed. Peter Fenves
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 125
167 Questions such as these continue throughout the entire length of the text.
168 Den-ida's analysis of the potential subjective motives behind the apocalyptic tone, however, goes no further
dtan dtis: "The end is beginning, signifies the apocalyptic tone. But to what ends does the tone sigttify this? The
apocalyptic tone naturally wants to attract, to get to come, to arrive at this, to seduce in order to lead to this, in
other words, to the place where the first vibration of the tone is heard, wltich is called, as will be one's want,
subject, person, sex, desire." Ibid, 151
169 Ibid, 144
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of history, the death of god, the end of philosophy, the last man, the end of class stmggle,
the closure of metaphysics, and so on.170 However, as facile as this constmal appears, it is
actually a quite decisive moment in Denida's argument. For, in isolating 'the limit' as what is
essential to this discourse, he is able to abstract from these writings the rHost minimal formal
criteria for identifying apocalyptic writing. This, in turn, gives rise to cmcial consequences:
And whoever would come to refme, to say the finally fmal [/efin dll jin] ,
namely the end of the end [lafin de 1a./ln], the end of ends, that the end has
always already begun, that we must still distinguish between closure and end,
that person would, whether wanting to or not, participate in the concert. [...J
U:7ith the reslIlt that JJJe can JJJonder IfeSi'hatology is a tOile, or ellen the voice itseif. Isn't the
voice aluJ{!ys that qfthe laYt man?l7!
Not only is this criterion slack enough to allow Derrich to excuse himself of his own
participation in philosophical eschatology - it also gives him license to secretly hypostasize
the foretelling of doom, elevating this appeal to an essential cotnponent of all discourse. It is
only on account of the imprecision of his defrnition of the apocalyptic that he is able to
make such a clain1. Next, Derrida attempts to substantiate his argument by calling to witness
those philosophers he had just prosetibed. He cites Nietzsche's fragment "Oedipus:" "I call
myself the last philosopher, because I am the last man. Noone speaks with me but myself,
and my voice comes to me like the voice of a dying man!"172 Even if we WCJ:e to grant that
170 "Haven't all the differences [dijJeretidJj ," he goes on to say, "taken the form of a going-one-better in
eschatological eloquence, each newcomer more lucid than the other, more vigilant and more prodigal too,
coming to add more to it: I tell you this in truth; this is not only the end of tIllS here but also and first of that
there, the end of history, the end of class stmggle, the end of philosophy, the death of God, the end of
religions, the end of Christianity and morals, the end of the subject, the end of man, the end of the West, the
end of Oedipus, the end of the earth... ?" Ibid, 145
171 Ibid, 145-146, my emphasis
172 Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. Daniel Breazale, Pbilosophy and Trrttb: Selections/rom Nietz.rrbe's Notebooks?!tbe EarlY
1870:,~ (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979), 33-34 (#87)
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this passage exemplifies the voice of eschatological eCliture, this is still to say nothing of the
dailYl to universality Derrida is arguing for. This does not, however, prevent Derrida from
taking his presentiment even further.
Returning to one of his perennial insights, namely, that in all writing the addresser
and the addressee may be equally disowned, Derrida now ascribes this characteristic to the
apocalyptic genre exclusively: "One does not know to whom the apocalyptic sending rehlrtlS;
it leaps from one place of emission to the other; it goes from one destination, one name, and
one tone to the other... ,,173 In taking this structure to be fundamental to the discourse on
crisis, Derrida is able to explode his prior clail"n:
... as S0011 as one no longer knows who speaks or who writes, the text
becomes apocalyptic. And if the elllJoir always refer [rollJoient] to other ell1!oi.r
without decidable destination, the destination remaining to come, then isn't
this completely angelic structure, that of the Johannine apocalypse, isn't it
also the sb~ucture of every scene of writing in general? This is one of the
suggestions I wanted to submit for your discussion: wouldn't the apocalyptic
be a transcendental condition of all discourse, of all experience even, of every
mark or every trace? And tne genre of writings called 'apocalyptic' in the
strict sense, then, would be only an example, an e:\:eJJJplary revelation of this
transcendental structure.174
Earlier, Derrida suggested that eschatology is not only a tone, but indeed, "the voice itself."
Now, his deconstruction of the tone leads him to posit the apocalyptic claim as not merely a
possibility available to the writer, but a condition for the possibility of writing as such. As I
noted earlier, Derrida's argument does not expressly preclude the possibility that appeals to
crisis can be traced back to the intentions of the subject of eschatological discourse. Even
173 Jacques Derrida, trans. John Leavey, Jr., "On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy," in fuliJitig tbe
Tone ofPhiloJophy: Late EJJ't!YJ 0' Immalluel Kallt, Trall~for",atitle Ctitiqtle by jatqtteJ Denida , ed. Peter Fenves
(Baltimore: The Jol111s Hopkins University Press, 1993), 156
174 Ibid, 156-157
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after Derrida raises the apocalyptic to the status of a transcendental structure, he
recognizes that, in the narrower sense, it still lives on. But what becomes of such appeals?
What of those critical diagnoses with which we have been concerned? Arc they no morc
than exemplary formulations of the crisis always already underway in writing? Could they be,
1 "b d " ,,175at Jottom, ut so many esperate attempts ... so many autoUl1rllU1lltary m.ovements,
independent of the interests and participation of every other subject?
In both essays,Derrida insists on the necessity of deconstructing the discourse on
crisis. While he fails to acknowledge in "Autoin1munity" the way in which his own account
may preclude the possibility of critical intenTention, in "On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic
'Tone in Philosophy," he appears increasingly aware of the limits of deconstmctive criticism:
We cannot and we must not - thl:r iJ a imv and a deJtil!J'- forgo theA4kkirttl1<~,
in other words, what imposes itself as the enigmatic desire for vigilance, for
the lucid vigil, for elucidation, for ctitique and tmth, but for a truth that at
the same time keeps within itself some apocalyptic desire, this time as desire
for clarity and revelation, in order to demystify or, if you prefet, to
deconstruct apocalyptic discourse itself and with it everything that speculates
on vision, the imminence of the end, theophany, parousia, the last
. d 176IU gment.
Derrida asserts that "this demystification must be led as far as possible,,,m that in face of
apparent urgency, one JnttJt remain vigilant, one !J1!tJt adopt a critical stance. His conflation of
"1 " d " 1 . " h th b 'd h . fl' ,. 1aw an c estmy seeJTIS to suggest, owevct,at ,c consl ers t c neceSSity o' t l1S CtltlCa
175 .Iacques Derrida, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and 'Michael B. Naas, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic
Suicides," in Philosop1y ill a Time r!f'Terror: Dialogues JJJith Jiirgell Habermas alld]m:qtles Dertida, ed. Giovanna
Borradori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 99
176 Jacques Den'ida, trans. John Leavey, Jr., "On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy," in RaiJilig the
TOile ofPhilosophy: Late Essqys by I,llmaNtle! Katzt, Trall~fotmative critique by]a(ques Derrida, ed. Peter Fenves
(Baltimore: The .Iohns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 148, my emphasis
177 Ibid, 159
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response less a matter of individual responsibility d1an the force of reason. Indeed,
throughout his reading of Kant's essay, Derricla intimates time and again that it is impossible
to rigorously distinguish between the Enlightenment interest in rational emancipation and
the apocalyptic desire for revelation. And yet, if it is the case that Derrida elevates the
apocalyptic tone to a transcendental stmcture of all writing, all but eliminating the subjective
dim.ension embedded within this appeal, then, in recognizing that "demystification must give
in to the finest (3ivel'sity of apocalyptic mses,"pg and thus, collapsing d1e distinction between
critique and crisis, it appears that he has incapacitated in advance the same work of criticism
he now invokes. The philosophical response to 9/11 Derrida invokes in "AutOllrUIlunity"
must be read in dus light. Our impression of 9/11, Derrida says, was determined in advance
by the hegemonic \X!estern hermeneutic apparatus; so too are our efforts of critical reflection
and intervention. Not only, however, arc these informed by the sam.e apparatus - they are,
Derrida claims, indistinguishable from it. To speak of crisis, for Derrida, is always already to
speak it! crisis: language, in running along ahead of us, leaves us behind. On his own terms
then, Derrida's diagnoses lapse into nJ.ere autopsy; they thereby renounce their claim upon
the living - all those who would, in truth, find themselves claimed by the crisis of 9/11.
In deconstructing the apocalyptic tone, Derrida effectively depoliticizes die discourse
of crisis. As both disaster and intelvention are thought here primarily in terms of the activity
of a singular, trans-historical subject, Derrida's exhortations lose their prescriptive power;
they appear rather like a narration of the unfolding of Getst in which "d1e worst can
178 Ibid, 149
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simultaneously appear insubstantial, fleeting, light."179 Although he never explicitly
dismisses the tole subjective motivation may play in appeals to crisis (this is manifestly the
case in his reflections on 9/ 11), in asnibing all critical activity to one and the same subject,
Derrida practically eliminates precisely what these injunctions accent: the sense of urgency
necessaly to incite wide-scale, collective effort among a plurality of subjects. The critique of
crisis Derrida develops through these t\vo essays urges us to recognize the way that claims of
crisis arc always conditioned by factors which tend to go unnoticed. To this degree, his
critique is effective. However, when deconstruction becomes auto-telic, eclipsing the ends of
such criticism, it goes too far. Left unanswered, Habermas' diap110sis of crisis remains
C' 0
hJ1)othetical - granted a transcendental status, far removed from the interests of the people,
Derrida's call rctnains unanswerable.
179 Jacques De11.1.da, trans. Pascale-Amle Brault and 1'dichael B. Naas, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic
Suicides," in Philosophy ill a Time ofTert'or: Dialogues )lJith Jiirget) Habertllas alJdJacqtte.f Dertida, ed. Giovaul1a
Borradori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 99
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